

Deepening Participatory Democracy:  
Social Auditing in Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh  
and Orissa

Shekhar Singh  
[shekarsingh@gmail.com](mailto:shekarsingh@gmail.com)

Prepared for the  
World Bank

2008

<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>I. SOCIAL AUDITS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Objectives of a Social Audit .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>The Method of Social Audits.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>The Process of Social Audits .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Major Vulnerabilities of the Social Audit Process.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Institutional Responsibilities and Functions .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>The Stakeholders and What is at Stake .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<i>The Affected Communities .....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Central Political Leadership.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>State Political Leadership.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Local Political Leadership.....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>State Bureaucracy.....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Local Bureaucracy.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Elected Panchayat Functionaries .....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>NGOs and People's Groups.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Contractors, Land Owners and Wage Employers .....</i>	<i>14</i>
<b>II STATE EXPERIENCES .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>IIa THE RAJASTHAN EXPERIENCE .....</b>	<b>16</b>
Initiating Social Audits .....	16
<i>Reactions of the Lower Bureaucracy.....</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Reaction of the Politicians .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>The Next Phase .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Beginnings of the Impact .....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Threatening the System .....</i>	<i>19</i>
Institutionalising Social Audits.....	19
<i>Government led Social Audits.....</i>	<i>19</i>
The Dungarpur Social Audit.....	20
<i>Preparation.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Objectives.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Expenses.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Follow up and Outcome.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Findings .....</i>	<i>21</i>
The Banswara Social Audit .....	21
<i>Letter of Protest .....</i>	<i>22</i>
The Jhalawar Social Audit.....	23
<i>Findings .....</i>	<i>23</i>
<b>IIb THE ANDHRA PRADESH EXPERIENCE .....</b>	<b>23</b>
Initiating Social Audits .....	24
<i>Ananthapur Social Audit.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>The process .....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Follow up and Outcomes .....</i>	<i>25</i>
Institutionalising Social Audits.....	26
<b>IIc THE ORISSA EXPERIENCE.....</b>	<b>27</b>
Institutionalising Social Audits.....	28
Initiating Social Audits .....	28
<i>Findings .....</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Follow up and Outcome.....</i>	<i>29</i>

<b>III ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION</b> .....	31
Transparency.....	31
Dependence on the Government.....	31
<i>Issues of Costs and Political Dependence</i> .....	32
<i>Issues of Dependence in Andhra Pradesh</i> .....	33
<i>Issues of Dependence in Orissa</i> .....	34
<i>Issues of Dependence in Rajasthan</i> .....	35
Follow Up and Outcome.....	35
Political Will.....	37
<i>Political Support in Andhra Pradesh</i> .....	37
<i>Political Support in Orissa</i> .....	38
<i>Political Support in Rajasthan</i> .....	38
Conflict and Violence.....	38
<b>IV CONCLUSIONS</b> .....	40
Status of Social Audits in the Three States.....	40
<i>Rajasthan</i> .....	40
<i>Andhra Pradesh</i> .....	40
<i>Orissa</i> .....	41
The Challenges Ahead.....	41
REFERENCES.....	43
Annexure I.....	44
Annexure II.....	49
Annexure III.....	54
Annexure IV.....	60

## INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to trace the evolution of the process of social audits from its inception in Rajasthan, to its subsequent incarnation in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. It also attempts to highlight the differences in the approach adopted in each state and the implications of these differences. For Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, the focus is almost entirely on the social auditing of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). In Rajasthan, where social audits preceded by many years the introduction of the NREGS, earlier experiences with other government schemes and activities are also discussed.

The first part of the paper is an attempt to develop a conceptual framework within which one can understand social audits. A definition is attempted and there is a discussion of some of the critical principles underlying social audits. The second part of the paper describes and discusses the social audit experience in these three states. The third part of the paper discusses some of the major issues emerging from these experiences and seeks to highlight successes and failures, and the reasons behind these. The paper concludes with a discussion on the present status of social audits and the challenges ahead.

Many people have shared their thoughts and experiences and contributed in various ways to the writing of this paper. These include Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey of the MKSS; Maiyetri Das and Shonali Sen of the World Bank, Yamini Aiyar of RaaG; K. Raju and Karuna Vakati Aakella of the Government of Andhra Pradesh; Sowmya Kidambi of the MKSS and Government of Andhra Pradesh; R. Rajakutty of the NIRD; Rajkishor Mishra of the Orissa Social Audit coordinating Group; Ram Vir Singh and Saswat Mishra of the Government of Orissa; and KS Gopal of the Centre for Environment Concerns, Hyderabad. Vishaish Uppal and Raman Mehta helped with field visits and data analysis respectively, and Misha Singh and Uma Bordoloi gave me many helpful editorial inputs. Needless to say, opinions (unless specifically attributed to some one else) and infirmities are solely mine.

Shekhar Singh  
New Delhi  
8<sup>th</sup> October, 2008

## I. SOCIAL AUDITS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The concept of social auditing is constantly changing and evolving and it is perhaps too early to settle on a definition. However, even as it rapidly evolves, some general principles seem to be emerging.

### **Objectives of a Social Audit**

Social audits have a multiplicity of objectives, perhaps the most important among them being the empowerment of the people. A successful social audit tilts the balance of power in favour of the community and away from the traditional centres of power within and outside the government. It empowers the community to demand answerability from the government, especially through local level functionaries. It also gives communities the confidence that they can collectively take on those powerful interests who conspire to deny them their rights.

*An innovative feature of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is that it gives a central role to 'social audits' as a means of continuous public vigilance (NREGA, Section 17). The basic objective of a social audit is to ensure public accountability in the implementation of projects, laws and policies. (Section 12.1.1, NREGA Guidelines, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India)*

Another objective of social audits is to minimise leakage and wastage of public resources and funds, and to promote frugality in their use. A community, empowered to manage its own critical resources, is far more likely to ensure efficient and sustainable use of these resources, than elected or appointed functionaries are.

The empowered participation of the affected community can also lead to significant improvements in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of government schemes and programmes. Such empowered participation enhances the local appropriateness of schemes and programmes and improves their chances of achieving the intended social objectives.

The coming together of a community to conduct social audits also helps to build formal and informal community institutions that can become agents of change and promote public participation around various other issues. In this way, social audits help develop a capacity and a momentum for collective decision making involving the entire community and not just a few elected representatives.

### **The Method of Social Audits**

Even more than the objectives, what marks out social audits from other forms of audits is the inherent methodology. The core of the social audit method is to involve, in the process of auditing, the entire group or community (or as many among them as are willing) that is affected (in the widest sense) by the scheme or programme that is being audited. Therefore, it is not an audit by elected representatives of the community, or by people appointed for the purpose, but an audit done by all the primary stakeholders.

The main advantage of such an approach is that, whereas it is possible to co-opt, pressurise or isolate elected, nominated, or appointed auditors, it is virtually impossible to do so to the whole community. Corruption (or rent seeking) is profitable where a few people share the spoils extracted at the cost of the many. If an entire community needs to be paid off to keep quiet about the loss of benefits that were rightfully theirs, then clearly the amount of pay off

must at the very least be equal, if not greater, than the benefit that was lost. However, this would make corruption uneconomical.

The inequitable distribution of wealth and power in India makes it commonplace for a few powerful people to bully the majority and deprive them of their rights. However, when communities combine, their collective strength allows the people to reassert their rights. Where the government also lends its support to the social audit process and external forces like the media, NGOs and people's movements are also involved, it becomes increasingly difficult to pressurise or marginalise the community and their social auditors.

### **The Process of Social Audits**

Where the initiation of social audits is by an agency external to the community, there must be a decision on which schemes or activities are to be audited, and where. The concerned communities need to be contacted and their support and participation ensured. Where required, members of the community need to be trained in the modalities of social audits, and the concerned government agencies approached and their participation and support solicited.

Assuming that public support and participation is forthcoming, social auditors from among the community or from a support group like an NGO or a movement then access the relevant information, usually by filing applications under the Right to Information Act 2005.

So, for example, for the NREGS the information typically asked for would include a list of the households in the village, a list of those who have applied for job cards (with date of application), a list of those who were provided job cards (with date), reasons why others (if any) were not provided job cards. Information would be sought on why job cards were provided late (if any were), and on the families who have applied for work (with number of days asked for and date of application). Also asked for would be a list of those given work (days given, date on which given, location and type of work), the basis for selecting the work and the site (was it discussed with the community and was it with their concurrence?).

The list of those not given work (along with reasons), and the list of those paid non-employment allowance (with amount and date) would also be accessed. If some eligible families were not paid, then reasons for not paying them would be sought. Also asked for would be a list of people paid wages with the amount paid (and basis of calculation), and date on which payment was made (reasons for late payment, if any). The list of facilities provided at the work site (as required under the NREGA), the nature and quantum of work done, copies of the muster roll, attendance register, materials register, bills and vouchers, etc. would also be sought.

Next, the social auditors (who might be local volunteers or members of NGOs and movements) do a household survey. They check the information provided by the authorities by visiting all the households in the village. They ask each family whether they had sought registration under the NREGA, and if so, whether they were registered, whether they had received their job card, whether they had got work within 15 days of requesting it, what wages they had been paid, when were they paid, etc. A note is made, and sometimes an affidavit taken from the family, if the official records do not tally with the testimony of the family. The team also invites the concerned family to attend the subsequent public meeting, where they could publicly voice their testimony and seek justice.

The team also seeks information about the works and the work site in order to determine whether the type of work taken up, the facilities provided, the implementation and measurement methods used, etc. were in conformity with the law and its guidelines.

The team also visits the work site and interviews the people there. Physical verification is done of the facilities provided at the NREGS worksite, the number of people working on the site on any given day, and whether other legal provisions are complied with, like making available on site a copy of the muster roll. The team verifies whether the workers have been explained the method by which the wages due to them would be calculated. There are discussions about the decision making process. Were the portfolio of works identified in accordance with community priorities, as expressed by them? Was the location and site as per the choice of the community? Was the community involved in monitoring the work, the purchases, and the use of materials?


The team also tries to determine the level of awareness among the people about the provisions of the NREGA and the related rules and guidelines, especially about their rights and privileges under the Act. Where the level of awareness is found to be inadequate, the team uses individual and group meetings as an opportunity to raise awareness.

The next step is to compile this information for the whole village in preparation of the public meeting.

Then it is time to organise a public hearing (*jan sunwai*) where the compilation is read aloud, along with affidavits relating to specific cases and the affected parties given an opportunity to speak. Ideally, the concerned officials and functionaries are present at the public hearing, along with their bosses, and discrepancies in the official information are examined immediately and a view taken. Where the concerned officials are present and cooperative, often, instructions are given right there and then to rectify matters (give a job card in x days, provide work immediately, pay delayed wages immediately, etc.). In some other cases, the matter is taken up for further enquiry or for action against the concerned official (especially where there are allegations of corruption or other criminal wrongdoing).

In all cases, even in cases where the concerned officials and functionaries are not present, the detailed evidence is recorded and a report is sent to the collector of the district and other concerned officials for further action.

A report is presented to the community during the next social audit or in a special meeting convened for the purpose, on the remedial measures and action taken (See table below for a schematic overview of the social audit process).





## **The Preconditions**

The success of social audits is dependent on many factors, the first of which is effective transparency. Information must be made available, at each stage, in a form that is understandable to the lay person and the semi-literate. The issue is not only about language but also about the comprehensibility of the information being provided. Government information is notoriously opaque to every one but a government servant. Therefore, as a part of the social audit methodology, formats need to be developed that “translate” officialise into the sort of language that can be comprehended by a lay person.

It is also important that the required information is made available well in time to allow enough time for the social audit process. The NREGA guidelines specify that the required information should be made available within a week of being requisitioned, drastically cutting short the 30 days limit allowed under the RTI Act.

Also required is a mobilisation of communities so that there is both a community demand for social audits and a community commitment to participate in them. Along with the demand and commitment, there is also the need to develop a capacity within the community to effectively conduct and participate in social audits, and a corresponding capacity among the government, the panchayati raj institutions, and the NGO community, to play their part in the social audit process.

The social audit process also requires extensive consultations with the community in order to factor in local knowledge, priorities, and preferences in the design and implementation of proposed works and activities. It requires prior informed consent of the entire community (the *gram sabha*) to make important decisions relating to the programme or scheme. The participatory and transparent monitoring and evaluation of the progress of a programme, and of its components and specifications, and the immediate and public response by the officials to issues and questions raised by members of the community, are two other critical requirements of social auditing.

Of critical importance is the provision of a secure and effective platform for conducting social audits. Social audits need an atmosphere that is free from fear and impending threats, and where people are allowed to speak freely and are patiently and attentively heard. For this reason it is helpful if there is a legal requirement to hold social audits and a corresponding obligation on state governments to ensure support and cooperation. Such a legal provision makes it a right of the community rather than something that is done at the discretion of the authorities.

In order to be effective, social audits must be conducted frequently and regularly. The NREGA, for example, requires that they be conducted every six months.

One very critical precondition for the success of the social audit is the assurance of adequate, timely, transparent and appropriate follow-up on the findings. This is imperative if social audits are to go beyond just making political statements or conducting research, to achieving some or all of their objectives

Another very critical precondition is an effective feed back mechanism that keeps the community informed of the impact and outcome of social audits. Prompt and regular feedback is essential if the communities are to be reassured that their participation in the social audit, and the attendant risks, were worthwhile. This also raises the morale of the

community and demoralises the wrong doers, undermining their sense of invulnerability, and thereby acting as a deterrent.

### **Major Vulnerabilities of the Social Audit Process**

Being a participatory and a transparent process, social audits are less likely to be corrupted or rendered ineffective than other forms of audit. However, some threats exist.

A common threat is collusion among the various agencies (usually NGOs or community groups) involved in facilitating the social audit, and the vested interests within and outside the government. Such a collusion can undermine the social audit process.

Another common method of subverting the process is to claim, on paper, that a social audit has been conducted without ever conducting one. This is common where either there is a conspiracy to cover up facts and issues that might emerge in a genuine social audit, or where there is a requirement to conduct social audits (as in the NREGA) without the wherewithal or the motivation to do so. Unfortunately, as there is no feed back to the community they are usually unaware that they were entitled to conduct a social audit, or even that one has been claimed to have been conducted in their name. In many parts of the country such perfunctory or ghost social audits are being conducted to fulfil the legal requirements under the NREGA to hold social audits every six months.

The success of a social audit depends significantly on the preparatory work done in advance. Therefore, after copies of the required information have been accessed, there first has to be a process by which this information is organised in a manner that allows for meaningful verification. This needs to be followed by a detailed and painstaking process of house to house visits where the official information is explained, a rapport is established, and the information is verified. Where it is found to be inaccurate, members of the household need to agree to give an affidavit and, if possible, to attend the public meeting and to speak up, if called upon to do so. The provision of inadequate or incomprehensible information, or its provision at the last-minute, undermines this essential process, as do hurried social audits where the agenda is only superficially dealt with.

The lack of preparation is another common stumbling block, as is the lack of appropriate training and capacity to conduct social audits. Usually, there is a proliferation of social audits much beyond the capacity of trained personnel. This often leads to unsatisfactory social audit practices.

Often, when powerful vested interests are threatened, and where the people still choose to speak out, there is the threat of disruption. Many social audits have been disrupted by hired goons, who have threatened teams doing household surveys, or disrupted public meetings and not allowed them to proceed.

Perhaps the most significant impediment to the success of social audits arises when people are hesitant to speak out, because of fear or cynicism. Where powerful vested interests are challenged and where these vested interests appear to have the explicit or implicit support of local government functionaries, this unwillingness is understandable. The insecurity is exacerbated when the social auditors are from outside the community and the vested interests are local, with whom the local community has to co-exist even after the social audits are over.

Another sort of vulnerability arises when there is a conspiracy of silence, not out of fear but because of shared spoils. Ordinarily this can only happen when a majority of the community, or the influential elements in the community, are co-opted into the conspiracy. Therefore, if ghost roads are built or ghost work is done and members of the community are paid wages for work that they did not do, there is often an incentive to join the conspiracy of silence.

Even where proper information has been accessed in time and the detailed process of verification has been properly carried out, a social audit can be stymied by the refusal or disinterest of government agencies to participate. By not attending the public hearing, or being unsympathetic during the hearing, they can significantly lessen the positive impact of a social audit. Even after the social audit, if the government decides to ignore the findings or not to get back to the community on the preventive and remedial action taken, it undermines the efficacy of social audits.

In the ultimate analysis what defeats social audits as an accountability tool is the unwillingness of the community to continue to engage in the process. This can happen because of a lack of follow up, lack of reporting back on follow up, or the development of hostile conditions which make participation in social audits very risky.

### **Institutional Responsibilities and Functions**

The government at various levels has the primary, if not the sole responsibility to ensure the timely dissemination of relevant information in a comprehensible manner. It also has the primary responsibility of ensuring a secure social audit platform.

As mentioned earlier, social audit cannot be conducted where there is constant threat of violence or disruption.

Equally important, the government also has the responsibility of ensuring timely and appropriate follow up on the findings of the social audits. And once appropriate follow up has been ensured, the government also has the responsibility of ensuring that there is effective feedback to the concerned communities.

*The Gram Sabha shall conduct regular social audits of all the projects under the Scheme taken up within the Gram Panchayat. (sec. 17(2) of the NREGA)*

The responsibility for capacity development is shared by the government and by NGOs and people's movements. The responsibility for mobilising the people and getting them to demand for, and participate enthusiastically in, social audits must ordinarily be that of NGOs, people's movements and citizen groups like youth groups, mahila mandals (women's groups), trade unions, and other such. Of course, the task of mobilising people becomes easier if the government has ensured that its responsibilities have been fully carried out. However, sometimes mobilisation precedes government action, and is responsible for provoking it.

The roles of the various stakeholders and facilitators are subject to the conflicts of interest that they each face, as described below.

### **The Stakeholders and What is at Stake**

There are many stakeholders affected in one way or another by social audits. These include (specifically for the NREGA):

- The affected community (and their groups and organisations)
- The central political leadership
- The state political leadership

- The local political leadership
- The state bureaucracy
- The local bureaucracy (block/panchayat level)
- Elected panchayat representatives and functionaries
- NGOs and people's groups
- Contractors, land owners and wage employers

### *The Affected Communities*

The affected communities by and large welcome social audits. Often their main concern is the possible adverse repercussions of exposing corruption or other wrongdoing by powerful people. They also become cynical and non-responsive if social audits do not lead to action and positive change. Social audits obviously give them a temporary sense of empowerment, but for them to be actually empowered they must, through social audits, be able to bring about real and enduring change.

However, local communities can also be collectively complicit in wrongdoing and, therefore, opposed to social audits. For example, where wages for “ghost works” are received and shared with supervisors, the community develops a vested interest in preventing a social audit.

### *Central Political Leadership*

The central political leadership, along with the national media, intellectuals and even NGOs have in the past been fiercely divided over the desirability of NREGA. There were many questions on whether we could afford this sort of expenditure, whether this was the best way of spending so much money, whether the poor would be better served if these huge amounts were invested in education and health, and so on. But perhaps the most widespread and persistent concern was about the leakages that were anticipated, resulting in much of this investment going to line the pockets of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. In response, the requirement for social audits (and the enactment of the RTI act) were offered by the supporters as two major bulwarks against corruption. These supporters, therefore, have a vested interest in ensuring that social audits are successful. If they fail, the sceptics might once again try to scuttle the NREGA.

Perhaps even more important is that the NREGA represents a unique opportunity for the political parties who enacted it to get an electoral advantage at the next elections. For this to happen, at least two pre-conditions need to be satisfied. One, that the party should be able to claim credit and, second, that the programme must be effective enough for there to be some credit to claim. If the benefits of the NREGA do not reach the common person, then a great political opportunity is lost, and the central political leadership seems conscious of this.

### *State Political Leadership*

The state political leadership, being closer to the ground, usually has larger contradictions to resolve. On the one hand, there is huge political mileage to be gained, without any burden on the state exchequer, if this programme can actually deliver the promised hundred days of employment to all those who want it. It is a bonanza for the ruling party in the state, for it can now promote a “populist” programme that has no limitation in terms of budgetary allocations, and does not cost them a penny. If they can ensure that this money actually goes to the intended

beneficiary, they also stand a good chance of beating the dreaded “anti-incumbency” factor that is often their nemesis. On the other hand, most political parties at the state level need to keep various factions, the local leadership and the rank and file of their parties happy, and this means that some leakages must be allowed. Party coffers have to be filled, and the party cannot afford to miss such a lucrative opportunity.

However, where the programme is inactive or plagued with corruption, it also provides a unique opportunity for the opposition to raise the issue and thereby get political “brownie points”.

For many states, there is an added pressure. The NREGA is seen as representing a favoured programme of the central party leadership and the state leadership cannot afford to ignore it. Further, the provision in the NREGA that funds can be stopped by the Central Government if various conditions, like the proper conduct of social audits, are not complied with also puts pressure on the states to comply with the requirements.

#### *Local Political Leadership*

The corrupt among the local political leadership would obviously welcome NREGA but try and make social audits ineffective. However, if for some reason social audits do take off in their area (either pushed by NGOs and movements, as in Rajasthan; or by the state government, as in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa), then it is difficult for them to oppose them, at least publicly. For, at the local level they have to make sure that they do not alienate the populace, who mostly stand to gain from social audits and are also the electorate in the next elections. On the other hand, the proliferation of social audits makes it difficult for them to make money out of government schemes. And even if they are willing to forego their own share of the spoils, they still have to deal with the acquisitive demands of their workers and supporters.

#### *State Bureaucracy*

The dilemmas of the state bureaucracy are perhaps the most vexatious. They have to juggle and reconcile the multiple and often contradictory demands of the Central Government, their state political leadership and the local political leadership. Assuming that there are no rent seekers among them, they also have to reconcile the demands of social audits with the imperatives of departmental loyalty, and with the entrenched bureaucratic instinct and tradition not to admit to outsiders (including legislative assemblies and the Parliament) any weaknesses within their own department, but publicly deny all wrongdoing. The predominant bureaucratic wisdom is that action, where it is unavoidable, should be discreet and departmental. Social audits, however, demand just the opposite.

They face very real threat of rebellion within their departments if they take cognizance of, and act upon, the indictments coming out of social audits. Also, most bureaucrats develop a “practical way” of dealing with corruption, essentially by ignoring all but the most blatant or “unacceptable” instances. However, social audits do not permit this. The acceptance levels of the poor, who have been deprived of critical survival resources because of “commonplace” corruption are far more stringent.

There is an understandable sense of being discriminated against if only a few departments are held publicly accountable. The officials in these departments question their bosses about why they are being singled out for harassment and humiliation.

#### *Local Bureaucracy*

In most instances of NREGA related social audits, it is the local bureaucracy which is, so to speak, directly in the firing line. Clearly the corrupt ones must hate the whole process, and would do everything possible to scuttle it. Even the honest and sincere ones can be under a lot of pressure, for social audits not only monitor financial leakages but also levels of efficiency. Therefore, local officers are now under additional pressure, added to the pressure for meeting the expectations of their bureaucratic bosses, there is now the pressure to satisfy the community. Perhaps, as social audits become established, the efficient and sincere officials would be better appreciated by the community, if for no other reason than because of the contrast with the corrupt and inefficient ones.

#### *Elected Panchayat Functionaries*

A similar dilemma confronts the elected functionaries. They are also in the firing line, but have to appear supportive of the process, or risk jeopardising their chances at re-election.

#### *NGOs and People's Groups*

NGOs and people's groups often take the lead in mobilising people and training them to participate in social audits. Many have whole heartedly embraced the social audit method as a preferred means of bringing about public accountability in various activities and schemes. However, there is a growing group of NGOs who are developing a vested interest in being social audit "middlemen". If not checked, there is the real danger that such groups would start controlling the social audit process and themselves become centres of power, at odds with community interests.

#### *Contractors, Land Owners and Wage Employers*

These are another group of powerful interests rallied against social audits. Contractors who undertake works and supply materials are among the main losers as public scrutiny of accounts and works increases. They can no longer supply sub-standard material, under and over invoice, or get paid for incomplete or ghost works.

*Recent news reports suggest that there is a demand from some owners of tea gardens in Siliguri that NREGA be suspended in the district, as availability of work under the NREGA has resulted in labour starting to demand the legal minimum wage from tea garden owners many of whom have been notorious for underpaying their workers.*

Even more interesting is the plight of the land owners and wage employers. The advent of NREGA in most parts of the country has resulted in people, perhaps for the first time, having an option to refuse the "less-than-minimum" wages paid by land owners and other wage employers and opt, instead, for work under the NREGA, where minimum wages are ensured through social audits. In many parts of the country the advent of NREGA has forced other employers to start paying the

minimum wages prescribed under the law – otherwise they might not get any workers. In some cases the illegal wages being paid by them have been exposed through social audits. There is, therefore, a lot of resistance from this class of citizenry.

Not surprisingly, there are various powerful interests lined up against social audits. There are the exploiters, the corrupt, the power brokers, and the political manipulators. Rallied against all these are local communities across the country, exercising their collective strength and their electoral clout, with the active support of decent politicians, civil servants, NGOs and people's movements.

## II STATE EXPERIENCES

### IIa THE RAJASTHAN EXPERIENCE

Social Auditing, as we know it today, has its genesis in the villages of Rajasthan. Spearheaded by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), it was initially used to expose corruption in the payment of minimum wages to daily-wage workers on government programmes.

The MKSS was founded in 1990 with the objective of fighting for the rights of workers and farmers, and their initial efforts were focussed on trying to ensure that all workers got the minimum wages stipulated by law. This soon led them to a demand for transparency, for muster rolls that contained details of the days worked and the wages paid were not accessible to the workers. Soon there was a felt need to institutionalise and collectivise the process of accessing and using government records and this led to the initiation of *jan sunwais* (public hearings) and the formalisation of the social audit process.

#### Initiating Social Audits

The first social audit and the constituent *jan sunwai* (public hearing) was organised in December 1994, in Raipur tehsil of Pali district in Rajasthan. The immediate provocation was a complaint by a poor, middle age, man about the underpayment of wages. Access was provided to the muster rolls, bills and vouchers courtesy a cooperative official, and the required information was copied by hand. The MKSS, in its later writings, admitted that this was a new approach, essentially an experiment.

“For the MKSS, organising a Public Hearing meant breaking new ground. For an organisation which had only organised public meetings, rallies and protests, there was a degree of apprehension about how the mode would be received and understood by the people. The very first question was whether people would turn up at all, how much space would it create for participation, and whether it would gain the legitimacy required to expose and deal with conflict-ridden local issues, including specific instances of corruption. Most importantly, it remained to be seen whether an atmosphere could be created where people would find the courage to openly speak out against those who had been exploiting them and the village even when they were present. Would this kind of democratic space be created?” (MKSS nd1, p4)

This first “social audit” had a very dramatic outcome. When verification of the records, so painstakingly copied by hand, was done in the villages it was found that the muster rolls listed payments to people long dead, or to those who had long ago migrated out of the region, or who had never worked on any project. There were also unknown people, essentially fictitious names. Initially it was not clear how these names had appeared in the muster rolls, but a subsequent examination of the electoral rolls of the villages solved the mystery, for the muster rolls appeared to be copied verbatim from the electoral rolls and contained all the errors that were there in the electoral rolls.

There were also cases where works were certified as complete while they actually remained unfinished. An inspection of the work done and a comparison with the bills and vouchers for that work revealed many cases where the amount of materials paid for were much more than those actually used.

As details of these discrepancies started emerging, there was outrage among the villagers. The Block Development Officer (who had initially facilitated access to the required



information) also started formally recording the statements of all those who had in one way or another been victims of this fraud. This galvanised those of the local politicians and officials who were beneficiaries of this fraud. They became apprehensive that their influence, their share of the loot, and in some cases even their jobs, were being threatened. Local goons were pressed into service to pressurise those who had given statements to withdraw them.

Nevertheless, on 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1994 the first *jan sunwai* was held in Kotkirana. What happened on this historic occasion is best described in the words of the MKSS:

“There was tremendous tension in the village. The local Mafia which was trying to prevent it from taking place, threatened to beat up the MKSS members. Alcohol was freely supplied to would be disrupters. But the enraged citizens of Kotkirana, including retired police and military personnel, and school teachers, were equally determined to ensure that the Jan Sunwai would be held. The combination of the workers demands for payment and the local middle class anger at being defrauded on development works, began a formidable if slightly awkward alliance that has continued to grow ever since.

“Sitting under the tattered parachute that served as the tent, the panellists who had come from Jaipur and Ajmer to witness and impartially record the proceedings, and the lone journalist who had been cajoled into attending the Jan Sunwai, saw a historical happening take place.

“The BDO and police sat some distance away, near the incomplete land records office. Ironically, this building had been shown as complete on record. They were the lone representatives of the State Government, and despite invitations to them to join the Jan Sunwai, they refused to move from their observation post. All the district Officials including the collector had been formally invited, but did not come.

“In spite of threats and a misinformation campaign that the Jan Sunwai would not be held, over a thousand people collected to state their cases and listen to the stories hidden in the papers. Person after person came to the mike, to say that their name was fictitiously recorded on the muster roll; that they were away on migration; that they did not do manual labour; that the names of their dead fathers and relatives had been entered. Names were even shown as present at more than one place at the same time on the same day and so on. With bills and vouchers too, there were discrepancies which amounted to blatant fraud.

“Money was shown as having been paid for purchasing stones that were never supplied for the Land Records Office, as the old building had been pulled down and the same stones were re-used for the construction of the new one.

“The people were the jury, approving as correct or shouting out against the rare incorrect statements made by the person at the mike. It was very difficult to lie in front of the whole village where everyone was an eyewitness. When the Jan Sunwai was over, the people still lingered. They were held by the issue and their personal involvement in it.” (MKSS nd1, p5)

#### *Reactions of the Lower Bureaucracy*

Close on the heels of this social audit and *jan sunwai*, four more were organised in Rajasthan in end 1994 and early 1995. As the news of these social audits spread all over the state, the corrupt elements among the bureaucracy began to realise the threat that social audits represented to their power and financial well being. In an effort to restrict their spread, the panchayat secretaries across the state of Rajasthan went on strike in early 1995. Interestingly,

their demand was that they should not be obliged to share information with anyone other than the official audit parties and their own superiors. Essentially, it was a strike asserting their right to be corrupt!

### *Reaction of the Politicians*

The local level politicians faced a serious dilemma. Though they were often beneficiaries of local level corruption, and certainly many of those involved in the corruption worked under their patronage, it was difficult for them to publicly oppose a demand from their electorate for accountability and transparency. Higher up, state politicians were also torn between the bad publicity of exposed corruption and the political brownie points of allowing and encouraging public accountability and government transparency.

The then Chief Minister of Rajasthan, after making many public statements in support of public accountability and transparency, made a commitment in the State Assembly, in April 1995, that the people of Rajasthan would be allowed to exercise their right to information. However, despite this, the matter lay dormant for nearly two years. It was only after the MKSS, supported by the newly formed National Campaign for People's Right to Information (NCPRI), launched an agitation, that the government finally came out with a notification amending the panchayati raj rules in Rajasthan and allowing public access to the relevant panchayat records. There is some dispute on when this order was issued, with the state government claiming that it was issued in December 1996, while the activists claimed to have first heard of it through a statement made by the Deputy Chief Minister in July 1997. It is intriguing that the order of December 1996, allowing transparency, seems to have itself been kept secret for seven months!

### *The Next Phase*

Once the legal right to access the required information was won, it was thought that the process of social auditing would become much easier. However, as the amended panchayati raj rules did not stipulate any penalty if information was not supplied, many panchayat functionaries initially refused to supply the requested information. In many cases people had to agitate in order to get the information they were entitled to. In other cases, the panchayat officials claimed ignorance about the amended rules – and would not take cognisance of copies given to them by the people as these copies had not come to them through “official channels”. As the government of Rajasthan appeared to have kept the existence of these orders a closely guarded secret for seven months, it is entirely possible that many of these functionaries were genuinely unaware of their existence

However, despite the various problems, the legal right to access information was a major empowering factor. It made a huge difference to the way the people looked at the process and, according to the MKSS, “...this time there was a demand and not a request for information.” [MKSS nd1, p17]

### *Beginnings of the Impact*

On January 9, 1998 a *jan sunwai* was scheduled in Kukarkheda, Rajsamand district, Rajasthan. Leading up to the *jan sunwai*, there was hectic activity aimed at verifying the records that had been extracted from the sarpanch after much effort and despite great reluctance on her part. A day before the *jan sunwai*, the sarpanch (a woman) approached the MKSS volunteers and expressed her desire to return the money that she had siphoned off from the panchayat funds during the previous year. The MKSS volunteers advised her to publicly return the funds to the village community, which she did the next morning during the

*jan sunwai*. She returned Rs. 50,000 and promised to return another Rs 50,000 in two monthly instalments so that the entire Rs. 100,000 that she had pocketed would be accounted for.

Her example was soon emulated by at least two other sarpanchs who each returned Rs. 114,000 and Rs. 147,000 respectively as full reimbursement of the money that they had illegally pocketed.

### *Threatening the System*

The trend of returning the money illegally pocketed, and by inference not pocketing anymore, seriously threatened the existing system. There appeared to have been detailed and agitated confabulations among the concerned officials, and the advice reportedly given to the panchayat functionaries was to refrain from returning any money. The argument was that returning money was an admission of guilt. In fact, those sarpanchs who had already returned money were asked to get it back.

The concerned officials reportedly gave assurances that no action would be taken on complaints made against the local panchayat functionaries. And in many cases, that is exactly what happened. Despite the significant amount of evidence gathered and recorded through the social audits, no action was taken on the charges of embezzlement and corruption, and the cases were either closed or simply ignored.

Needless to say, government indifference and inaction was very frustrating and disheartening for the people. There was a feeling among some that perhaps the community should not wait for the government to provide justice but should mete out justice itself. Fortunately, wiser counsel prevailed and the process was prevented from getting out of hand and becoming a type of kangaroo court.

### Institutionalising Social Audits

#### *Government led Social Audits*

Distinct from the MKSS facilitated social audits, the Government of Rajasthan had also initiated a series of social audits in early 1997. In these social audits, conducted by the district authorities, registers of the development work undertaken in the past fifteen years were prepared and read out in each gram sabha, for verification. However, these “social audits” were criticised by many of the people for there was little advance notice given to the people so that most of them either did not know about the reading, or found out too late to be able to attend. Further, only the total allocation and expenditure for each project was read out. There was no mention of how much was spent where, or how much material was bought and used. The bills, muster rolls and measurement books were not displayed for verification. Consequently, there was little public participation and no verification. Also, the whole “social audit” exercise was just one item in the long agenda of a gram sabha and was often completed in less than an hour, despite the fact that fifteen years worth of projects were to be discussed.

Nevertheless, this initiative paved the way for discussions between various people’s organisations and the state government. These resulted in the Government of Rajasthan issuing an ordinance, on 2 January 2000 (subsequently passed by the State Assembly), creating Ward Sabhas as a legal entity and vesting them with the power to conduct social audits. The Ward Sabhas and the Gram Sabhas were also given the right to remove the Ward

Panch or the Sarpanch from office before his or her term was over. This was perhaps the first instance where political recall was legally allowed in India.

Subsequently, in 2001, the Government of Rajasthan initiated a fresh round of social audits. They directed each Panchayat Samiti to randomly select one panchayat in each block and conduct *jan sunwais* in those that were selected. Unfortunately, these new sets of “social audits” also suffered many of the same problems that plagued their predecessors. More importantly, even where some discrepancies were spotted, no official cognisance was taken of them and no enquiry or remedial action was initiated.

### The Dungarpur Social Audit

The passing of the RTI and the NREG Acts, and the seeming lack of government intention and ability to institutionalise and internalise proper social auditing principles, meant that people’s groups in Rajasthan needed to continue facilitating social audits. Consequently, major initiatives were taken in Dungarpur ( 2006, 2007 ), Udaipur ( 2006, 2007 ), Sirohi (2006 ), Karoli ( 2007 ), and Banswara and Jhalawar (2007-2008). The social audit conducted

#### **NON NEGOTIABLES for the Dungarpur Padyatra**

1. To eat, one per household
2. Eat whatever is given by the family, normal every day food
3. No liquor to be consumed while on the yatra
4. No untouchability or discrimination on the basis of caste gender or religion will be condoned.
5. Sleep in a common place - school building etc -all yatris together.
6. Daily review meeting
7. No special privileges to anyone.
8. No special favours from the Sarpanch or any official or public representative who is connected with the implementation of the programme.

in Dungarpur district deserves special mention as it was a new approach where, rather than conducting social audits in single gram panchayats or at best in a one or two adjoining gram panchayats, an effort was made to conduct social audits simultaneously in a whole district. The “Rozgar Evum Suchana Ka Adhikar Abhiyan (Movement for employment and right to information) took up the challenge of organising this mammoth effort.

Dungarpur is a district in South Rajasthan, bordering Gujarat, with an area of 3770 sq km and a population (2001 census) of a little over 1.1 million. It was one of the 200 districts selected in the original batch for the introduction of NREGS. The NREGS became operative in this district from early 2006 and the district-wide social audit was initiated in April 2006. It was a huge affair involving nearly 700 volunteers, 150 from Dungarpur district and the rest from all parts of the country. There were ten volunteers even from Bangladesh!

### *Preparation*

As a lead up to the social audit, a meeting was held in February 2006, at Dungarpur, where the local people, local organisations, and the district administration committed to participate and support the social audit. In March, a training programme was organised where the trainers themselves were trained. The volunteers assembled in Dungarpur on 15 April and were trained for two days by these trainers, and then embarked on a *pad-yatra* (journey on foot), visiting village after village for the next nine days. The volunteers were divided into about 30 teams with between 20 to 30 volunteers per team. Each team spent a whole day in one village. They slept at night in a public building, like a school, and moved on the next day to the next village. In this way, these thirty teams covered all the 230 odd village panchayats in the district in nine days.

### *Objectives*

One major task of these teams was to spread awareness about the NREGA, especially the entitlements and rights inherent in it. Another task was to facilitate the verification of official records regarding the implementation of the NREGA and its provisions in the villages visited, and in the worksites associated with these villages.

### *Expenses*

In keeping with the MKSS approach to social audits, volunteers were asked to bear their own expenses as far as possible. Very little financial support was provided to these teams, and the cost of food, which would have been the major expense, was borne by the villagers. Each of the families in the village that were willing and able, fed one volunteer for the one day that the team was in their village. The transport costs were minimal, as the volunteers walked from village to village – or occasionally took public transport.

In one comical incident, members of a team that had spent the day finding discrepancies in the accounts maintained by a woman sarpanch, unwittingly arrived at her house to ask for an evening meal. The husband of the sarpanch, who was reportedly drunk, chased them away with the choicest of abuses – wondering at their gumption!

### *Follow up and Outcome*

The district administration had undertaken to supply all the information required and demanded under the RTI Act, and had also set up a control room to facilitate the process and to respond to complaints and grievances. There was, therefore, a real possibility of immediate redressal of grievances on a daily basis, as any discrepancies found in the official records, or any cases of under-payment or non-payment established, would be reported immediately to the control room, which would convey these to the Collector. The Collector would then try and address these grievances and act on these complaints everyday.

### *Findings*

The findings of the social audit were finally presented at a public meeting in Dungarpur on 25 April, 2006. This was attended by a large number of the local people, by the volunteers, and by many of the district and state officials, in addition to invited dignitaries from Jaipur and Delhi. Happily, very few cases of corruption or wrongdoing were detected. As per the findings published, the discrepancy between the official records and the reality were in the range of 2% to 3% and, though there were some cases of fraud entries in muster rolls or non-payment of full wages, these were few and far between.

Professor Jayati Ghosh of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, writing in *Macroscan*, described the outcome in the following terms.

“The results have been both impressive and inspiring. The mobilisation initiative has shown that when people are made aware of their rights and when the local authorities are forced to adhere to basic principles of transparency, there is huge response in terms of worker participation, reasonably efficient working of even a very new scheme and very little leakage.” (Ghosh 2006)

### The Banswara Social Audit

Another experience worth highlighting was that of the proposed social audit in Banswara district. Modelled after the Dungarpur social audit, it was to be held from the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> of December 2007. However, by this time active resistance had built up against social audits among various affected parties, particularly among those elements of the local bureaucracy

and politicians who risked exposure through these social audits. Protests were staged and local level functionaries refused to part with information, despite instructions issued by the state government to cooperate with the effort. Subsequently, the senior bureaucrats at the state level withdrew their instructions for co-operation and the minister concerned disassociated himself from the efforts of the people to audit their government's accounts.

Matters came to a head when volunteers of the Abhiyan were denied access to the records and information that they had requisitioned under the RTI Act, prevented from conducting the social audit, and physically assaulted. The volunteers, in response, sat in a *dharna* (protest sit-in) in front of the district administration office. They protested the inaction of the district authorities and demanded access to the records, as was their legal and constitutional right.

#### *Letter of Protest*

At the height of the confrontation Aruna Roy, one of the leaders of the Abhiyan, wrote a letter to the Chief Minister of Rajasthan. Dated 13<sup>th</sup> December 2007, the letter described the standoff in the following terms:

“At the time of the Social Audit conducted in Bagidora block of Banswara District in June this year, the Abhiyan had announced a mass social audit of the whole District before the end of the year. A schedule for a social audit in Jhalawar District was also announced for late January 2008. The Government of Rajasthan extended support to these social audits by participating in the tripartite effort. The Government helped provide information, provided official support to the organizing of gram sabhas, and took action on the established cases of corruption brought to light during the social audit.

“It seems as if even this limited amount of action taken after the Bagidora social audit was unacceptable to many elected representatives and gram sewaks in Banswara District. As soon as the Abhiyan applied for information, the Gram Sewak Sangh, the Sarpanch Sangh, the Pradhan Association, the MLAs of different parties have mobilized in large numbers and aggressive ways to say that they will not subject themselves to social audit. They have organized dharnas, rallies, passed resolutions, filed a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court, issued blatantly illegal orders preventing the disclosure of information as well as started physically assaulting beating up and roughing up activists who have gone to collect information. The objective seems to be to create an atmosphere of fear where people will not raise any questions about the implementation of the programme.” (Roy 2007)

She went on to decry the response of the state government to these pressure tactics and reiterated the resolve of the Abhiyan to carry out the social audit, notwithstanding.

“The Rajasthan government seems to have succumbed to this pressure, as is clearly indicated by a letter from the Secretary Rural Development issued on 1st December directing the release of information to conduct social audits only to be followed by a letter by the project director NREGA on 5th December disassociating itself from the social audit process. The Banswara District Administration has issued a series of orders to programme officers and panchayat functionaries to provide copies of records, but their orders have been flouted. The statements by political leaders in the state, along with the failure to provide copies of the records asked for so far, only confirms the public impression that the Government is acceding to the illegal intent of the vested interests to prevent transparency and accountability in public works programmes.

“The Abhiyan proposes to go ahead with a programme of social accountability, limited as it will undoubtedly be without open access to information, the hostility of local politicians and the attitude of the State Government. It will seek information as is the right of all citizens not only under the Right to Information Act, but also as per the provisions of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and operational guidelines. Jan Sunwais (public Hearings), public meetings, and padyatras will be organized as per the democratic rights of all people of India. There will also be a demand for the accountability of the Government of Rajasthan to fulfill its responsibility to carry out social audits as required under the NREGA. The government will also have to be fully accountable for the money received and expenditures incurred for Banswara District, as the model social audit.”  
(Roy 2007)

However, despite their resolve, the Banswara social audit had to be abandoned as hostility to the team and the process continued and conditions remained unsuitable for holding a social audit.

#### The Jhalawar Social Audit

Despite the setback in Banswara, the Abhiyan persisted with its plans to hold a social audit in Jhalawar district in early February 2008. This was despite the fact that the opposition that had started around the proposed Banswara social audit continued and even grew by the time the volunteers arrived in Jhalawar.

The teams that arrived in Jhalawar were greeted with hostility and abuse from a section of the population. There appeared to have been significant mobilisation by those opposed to social audits. In some cases, the volunteers were greeted by slogans condemning all NGOs and all social audits!

The Abhiyan, learning from its experience in Banswara, had changed its strategy and reverted back to the old model of social audits where, rather than taking up the whole district in one go, they focussed on those areas where they already had public support and a base. Though the hostility was not restricted to abuse and threats and some of the volunteers were physically attacked and injured, they were not deterred. With the support of the local villagers, social audits were conducted in five gram panchayats. Therefore, in some sense Jhalawar was a partial recovery after Banswara, where no social audit could be conducted.

#### *Findings*

These social audits exposed huge discrepancies between official records and the ground reality, and numerous cases of fraud were unearthed. Despite this, no representative from the government cared to be present in the final public hearing. Consequently, the findings were sent to the Collector after the hearing.

## **IIb THE ANDHRA PRADESH EXPERIENCE**

The Andhra Pradesh experiment with social audits took off from where the Rajasthan experience had stalled. In Rajasthan, there had been a consistent effort since 1994 to get the government to conduct and participate in proper social audits, but without much success. In Andhra Pradesh, the state government itself was the instigator and motivator of the process of social audits. Of course, the history of social audits in Andhra Pradesh is comparatively short, just a little over two years old.

### Initiating Social Audits

Supported and facilitated by the Hyderabad office of Action Aid India and with the help of the MKSS, the Government of Andhra Pradesh organised social audits in three gram panchayats of Nalgonda district, in February 2006. These social audits were intended as training exercises to train those who would in future conduct social audits and also train others in social auditing. As the NREGA had just been initiated, these social audits assessed activities under the Food for Work programme.

### *Ananthapur Social Audit*

Training programmes continued till August 2006. Towards the end of August, the state government organised the first of the social audits for the NREGA. About 1500 *padyatris* (foot travellers) gathered in Ananthapur district to be trained in the running of a social audit. In the first week of September these *padyatris* travelled from village to village, conducting social audits and verifying the records accessed from the government. This culminated in public hearings on the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> of September where the findings from over 600 habitations across 38 *mandals* were shared with the villagers, officials and dignitaries alike.

Starting from Ananthpur, the state sponsored and trained social auditors spread across all the NREGA covered districts and started conducting intensive social audits.

### *The process*

The social audit approach adopted in Andhra Pradesh was very similar to that developed in Rajasthan after years of trial and error. Essentially the steps involved were:

- Filing of Applications under the RTI Act with the Mandal Parishad Development Officer (MPDO)/ Assistant Program Officer for the required records of the EGS in the mandal. The information required to conduct social audits was accessed by applying under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, and additionally invoking the NREGA

guidelines (section 12.5.1 (vi)) to demand that the required information be given within a week, as specified in the guidelines.

- Identification and training the Village Social Auditors, mainly three or four literate youth per village, who are trained for three days. They are then formed into a team and allocated a village other than their own.
- The records, including the muster rolls, accessed under the RTI act are verified by a door-to-door survey. In addition, focus group discussions are held to discuss the records. These discussions are also used to inform the wage seekers of their rights under the NREGA.

The AP programme targets those rural young men and women who have enough education to be literate but not necessarily enough to be employable in traditional jobs. These people, quaintly described as “Inter fail” (failed their final school examinations) are trained and motivated to become Village Social Auditors. To date, there are an estimated 50,000 of them across the villages of Andhra Pradesh.

- Once the verification has been done and affidavits have been taken from some or all of those who have a complaint, a public meeting is organised. In this meeting the results of the verification exercise are presented, along with affidavits, where required. Representatives of the government are invariably present in these hearings.
- Often remedial and corrective action is taken during or just after the public hearing by the officials present.
- There is a follow up after fifteen days, and the social audit team revisits the *mandal* to ensure that the decisions that are taken in the meeting have been carried out. They



also report back on any other decisions or action relevant to the findings of the social audit.

Social audits are conducted primarily by trained social auditors who are usually young men or women from the villages and mostly belonging to the families of wage labourers, the most obvious beneficiaries of the NREGA.

#### *Follow up and Outcomes*

One remarkable feature of social audits in AP is the follow up mechanism that the Government of AP has institutionalized. In this aspect it has achieved something that neither Orissa nor Rajasthan have achieved.

Essentially, in the AP model the concerned officials are obliged to be present for the social audit gram sabhas (public meetings) and are required to clarify and resolve the issues there and then. It is further required that senior officers shall, for each lapse or deviation, fix responsibility and take immediate corrective and/or disciplinary action. Where there is a doubt or dispute, an enquiry must be conducted as soon as possible and before thirty days have passed. Of course, the system does not work as well in practice as it sounds, and there are slippages, with officers absconding, follow up action neglected or money not recovered. Fortunately, the lapses are not frequent enough to detract from the deterrent value of the system, or to significantly undermine public confidence.

Where the guilty party is a contracted NREGS staff, criminal charges and termination of services are the usual fallouts. Where the person involved is a government official, action has to be initiated as per the civil service rules. There has been some criticism that only contract staff are being dismissed while regular government staff seem to be getting away unscathed. Unfortunately, it is inherent in most government systems in India that action against permanent government functionaries is a long drawn-out process. The only saving grace is that sometimes the process of enquiry, investigation and trial is nearly as harrowing as the ultimate penalty.

In AP, there is also great stress on the recovery of the embezzled amounts, the recovery in 16 districts as a result of social audits for NREGS was over one crore (ten million) rupees.

The AP model further requires that where the funds recovered are due to those who have laboured under the NREGS, in terms of wages due but not paid, these should be paid to them within seven days of recovery.

There is also the requirement that an 'action taken' report should be filed by the programme officer within a month of the social audit being conducted and the same should be communicated to the gram sabha, thereby completing the information loop (one such report is attached at annexure I).

Specifically, the outcomes claimed by the state government include:

- Recoveries from the people who have misappropriated money in the EGS. So far, more than Rs.1 crore 25 lakhs have been recovered through the Social Audit process
- Termination of EGS functionaries who have been found to have indulged in misappropriation and embezzlement of money from the EGS (Action has been taken against more than 1000 Field Assistants and 10 Training Assistants. Nine

departmental enquiries have been initiated, 14 criminal cases have been filed, and suspension has been ordered of 3 Mandal Parishad Development Officers (MPDO's))

- Training of more than 300 MPDO's in the Social Audit process, where they have been part of the SA teams and actually participated in the entire process of verification and then read out their reports in the Public Meeting
- Training of Sarpanchs in the Social Audit process, to spread awareness with regard to the NREGS and to ensure that they understand the modalities involved. It makes them realize that any intended or unintended deviation will become public.

Writing recently in *The Hindu*, Mihir Shah and Parmathesh Ambasta summarise the achievements of the social audit process in Andhra Pradesh in the following terms.

“One full round of this process has now been completed in over 35,000 habitations. This is nearly half of rural Andhra Pradesh. Around 30,000 trained village youth are conducting this social audit that has already covered more than 12 million people. Nearly Rs.1.25 crore of misappropriated funds have been recovered. On many occasions, errant officials have “voluntarily” returned money to workers at the mandal public meeting itself. The palpable impact on rural governance of such a spectacle, which invariably continues uninterrupted for 10-12 hours, is easy to imagine. Action has been initiated against thousands of officials and a number of criminal cases have been instituted. Forty lakh NREGA records have been publicly scrutinised under the RTI. Independent studies reveal that awareness about the detailed provisions of NREGA has risen dramatically among workers” (Shah & Ambasta 2008).

#### Institutionalising Social Audits

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, specifically the Department of Rural Development, decided in early 2006 that it wanted to institutionalise social auditing for the NREGA across the entire state. In order to benefit from the experience of the groups conducting social audits in Rajasthan, they requested one of the experienced members of the MKSS to assist them in planning and implementing these social audits. Initially, they also involved Action Aid-India, a Delhi based NGO with a regional office in Hyderabad. Action Aid facilitated the process and provided logistical support during the initial stages of social audits in Andhra Pradesh.

In order to internalise the social audit process within the state government, while ensuring that it had enough objectivity and freedom of action, the Government of Andhra Pradesh created a unique and innovative institutional mechanism. They set up a Strategy and Performance Innovation Unit within the Department of Rural Development and ensured that it enjoyed a fair amount of functional autonomy. This unit was given the responsibility of facilitating the conduct of social audits in all the districts and gram panchayats covered under the NREGA, and had the authority of the state government to do so.

Therefore, by setting up such an institutional arrangement, the Government of Andhra Pradesh had effectively resolved many of the main issues plaguing social audits in Rajasthan. They had ensured that the exercise was credible and independent, yet given it the authority and the backing of the government, thereby assuring government participation in the process, including the cognizance of, and follow up action on, the findings of social audits.

Aruna Roy, in her earlier cited letter to the Chief Minister of Rajasthan (13 December, 2007) highlighted the difference between the state governments of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, though somewhat diplomatically.

“Rajasthan, along with States like Andhra Pradesh have been considered the pioneers of social audit where Government and civil society have come together to foster the social audit process, with very encouraging results. While the Andhra Pradesh Government has played a leading role in ensuring that the statutory social audit requirements are carried out in all the mandals and districts of the state, in Rajasthan, the administration has so far supported civil society efforts, and asked for support to help institutionalize the process. This seems to be changing in Rajasthan in the face of mounting political pressure over the last few days.” (Roy 2007)

More recently, in an editorial page article in the Hindu, Mihir Shah and Parmathesh Ambasta contrast the two states more starkly.

“...even in Rajasthan, where MKSS started its work, mainstreaming social audits has remained a distant dream. There has been violent resistance from the vested interests threatened with exposure and state support has been uncertain at best.

“By contrast, in Andhra Pradesh, instead of mutual ambivalence or hostility, the MKSS and the government are supporting each other to overcome the threshold of systemic defiance to such a radical initiative for transparency and accountability.” (Shah & Ambasta 2008 ).

## **Iic THE ORISSA EXPERIENCE**

The initiation of social audits as a means of public accountability of governments is a recent phenomenon in Orissa. Also, unlike Rajasthan, where people’s groups initiated the process, or Andhra Pradesh, where it was initiated because the government thought it important, in Orissa the initiation of large scale social auditing seems to have been a result of criticism and bad publicity regarding the implementation of the NREGA in the state.

In August, 2007 the Centre for Environment and Food Security (CEFS), Delhi publicly announced that “The findings of a survey conducted in 100 villages of Orissa’s 6 districts have revealed that out of Rs 733 crore spent under NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) in Orissa during 2006-7, more than Rs 500 crore has been siphoned and misappropriated by the government officials of implementing agencies” (Ray 2007).

This charge reportedly angered the Government of Orissa and spurred them into action. Accordingly, the state government decided to launch its own assessment and talked to a host of NGOs and educational and research institutions from within and outside the state. It finally invited the National Institute of Rural Development (NIRD), Hyderabad, to do an evaluation of the NREGS. The NIRD is an autonomous institute under the Ministry of Rural Development.

Discussions between the NIRD and the Government of Orissa threw up the idea of not restricting the assessment to conventional methods but to actually conduct social audits, initially in a sample of 40 gram panchayats. The NIRD, for its part, identified a group of Orissa based NGOs who would conduct the social audits.

### Institutionalising Social Audits

As discussed above, the Government of Orissa wanted to challenge the findings of the CEFS, but in a way that was credible and acceptable to the public. They also wanted to convince the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, which is the nodal ministry for the NREGA and has the authority to suspend NREGA funding to a state if they were not properly utilised, that the charges were not correct. Therefore, these twin objectives obviously determined the choice of the social audit institutional structure for Orissa.

It was important for the state government to opt for an institutional structure that was independent both of the state government and of the NGOs who had been involved or supportive of the CEFS study. Supporters of the Orissa approach argue that given the specific circumstances under which social audits were initiated in Orissa, the NIRD was perhaps the best choice as a facilitating agency. More radical NGOs would not have been acceptable to the Government of Orissa and a state government led model, as in AP, would have lacked the required credibility, given the allegations made by the CEFS. Therefore, it was essential to select an agency like the NIRD which, while being independent of the state government (and being under the Ministry of Rural Development, GOI), had the requisite credibility – but being essentially a government institution was unlikely to embarrass the state government.

However, critics and sceptics argue that by selecting as the facilitator an institution that had no experience of conducting social audits and little understanding of the process, the Government of Orissa could have sounded, knowingly or unknowingly, the death knell for social auditing even before it was properly born.

### Initiating Social Audits

The process of social audits began in February 2008 in 40 gram panchayats, in 40 blocks in the 19 districts covered under the first phase of the NREGA. The process continued till June 2008.

Initially, 200 volunteers were trained at the district level. An NGO was identified as the state coordinator, and one NGO each as district coordinator. For each gram panchayat a team of between eight to ten volunteers was formed. Each gram panchayat team had at least one or two volunteers who had participated in social audits before.

The teams followed the set process of accessing information, verifying information and then having a public meeting to discuss discrepancies, if any. However, unlike the Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh model, in Orissa the information was not accessed by using the RTI. The Government of Orissa had agreed, at the request of the NIRD, to provide the social audit teams all the information required to conduct social audits. This included the lists of families who registered under NREGS, those to whom job cards were given, those who had applied for work, those to whom work was awarded, the list of payments made against the number of days worked, etc. Unfortunately, in many cases this information was delayed and this resulted in either the postponement of the social audit or inadequate time for proper preparation.

#### CHALLENGES OF THE STUDY

- Records / Registers / Documents not provided till last date of SA – little time for verification in many GPs
- Line Departments brought documents only on the day of public hearing
- BDOs / GPs do not have list of works assigned to the line departments
- Disruption of public hearings by vested interest groups
- Preventing ‘whistle blowers’ from offering testimonies
- Inadequate expertise and over enthusiasm of some of the NGOs
- Inadequate participation of official and non-officials in SA (NIRD 2008)

The teams in each district selected three of the works undertaken under the NREGA in each gram panchayat and audited them. Some of these works were from 2007-08 and others from the 2006-07 (For a report of one unsuccessful and one successful social audit, see annexure II. A summary of the reports of all 40 social audits is at annexure III).

### *Findings*

The final results of the 40 social audits conducted in Orissa during 2008 by the NIRD led team can be summarised as follows.

- Nearly 11 % of registered families did not get job cards.
- Nearly 32% of the names in the muster rolls were fictitious. (The figure was 42% for works initiated in 2006-07, and reduced to 9% for works initiated in 2007-08)
- Nearly 53% of the person days paid for were not authentic (63% in 2006-07 reduced to 21% in 2007-08)
- More than 58% of the wages recorded as having-been-paid, were never paid. (67% in 2006-07 reduced to 38% in 2007-08)

Overall, the picture was bleak and the only saving grace seemed to be that the figures for the projects implemented during 2007-08 were significantly better than for those implemented in 2006-07 (For details, see annexure IV).

Reportedly, the Government of Orissa is now accepting that there might have been leakages at the initial stage of the NREGA, especially because of shortage of staff. According to them, these leakages have now been largely plugged.

Interestingly, the findings of the Orissa government/ NIRD social audit are not significantly different from those of the earlier conducted CEFS assessment, which had alleged that over 68% of the NREGA funds had been siphoned off. The findings of the NIRD social audit also found that 67% of the wages recorded (in 2006-07) were never paid. Further, if one looked at the data from the KBK region of Orissa, which was the region studied by the CEFS team, the figures for the wages recorded but not paid was 74% in the NIRD study, significantly higher than the CEFS study.

### *Follow up and Outcome*

Perhaps a major weakness in the Orissa process has been the absence of follow up on these findings. The genesis of this might well be in the understanding that the NIRD had with the Orissa Government. Reportedly, the NIRD had insisted and got the Government of Orissa to agree to two conditions before agreeing to conduct social audits. First, that if in the process of conducting social audits, cases are detected where job cards should have been made but were not made, then for all such cases the government would ensure that job cards are made. Second, that if cases of underpayment, non-payment or delay in payment of wages were detected, then the government would rectify this (Rajakutty, pers. Conversation.).

Clearly, these conditions were not enough as they included nothing about action against those who were responsible for the wrong doings, if any were discovered, and recovery of the money that was pocketed. Also, there was no agreement on reporting back to the community, nor about the time frame within which follow up would be done. One can only assume that these “oversights” were either a result of NIRD’s inexperience in conducting social audits or

their belief that the state government would not accept any demand for recoveries or action against wrong doers.

If the latter was the case, then it could be argued that perhaps in these circumstances NIRD should not have agreed to be involved in the social audits. This is especially so because a critical requirement, if social audits are to succeed and become sustainable over time, is that there must be an immediate, strong and transparent follow up on the findings of the social audit.

In any case, even months after the social audits, by and large no action seemed to have been initiated to recover money or initiate criminal and disciplinary action against the guilty parties. The only exception seems to have been the three or four social audits, where senior state level officials were present and ordered an enquiry into the complaints that emerged during the social audits,

In discussion with the state government officials it emerged that the reports of the social audits conducted were not being sent to the state government at the conclusion of each social audit, as is the practice in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. They, therefore, expressed their helplessness in taking action or following up on the findings of the social audits. Much later, during the “sharing meeting” on 4<sup>th</sup> August 2008, state government officials reiterated this stand when questioned about the lack of follow up.

“The participant wanted to know the follow up or the action initiated against the findings and complaints (that) came up during the process of social audit.

“It was responded by Mr. R.N. Dash, Commissioner cum Secretary, PR Department, that the dept. is yet to receive the social audit reports, after the receipt of the same, it will be posted in the website of the Panchayat Raj dept. and he also assured that the action taken report will be submitted within a stipulated period.” (Sharing Meeting Minutes 2008)

During earlier discussions, state government officials had conceded that as in most cases months had passed since the social audit was conducted, it would now be difficult to go back and investigate effectively the various complaints. They recognized the need to take action and conduct investigations as soon as possible, as delay made it difficult to get evidence.

Even in those few cases where enquiries were ordered, there was no reporting-back to the community. Reportedly, after the August sharing meeting, letters have gone out to the concerned district collectors directing that enquiries should be initiated where prima facie evidence exists. However, even in these instances, there appears to be no formal public announcement and no feed back to the affected communities, who largely remain ignorant about any follow up to the social audit, even months after the audit is over.

In any case, it is too early to assess the outcome of the social audit process in Orissa. It can only be hoped that the lack of immediate follow up and the absence of reports back to the community, do not significantly dampen public enthusiasm for social audits.

### III ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

The experiences of the three states discussed above raise many issues regarding the relative efficacy of the different approaches to social audits. Some of these issues are discussed below.

#### Transparency

Clearly early access to full and accurate information is a critical precondition to successful social audits. The question is – which of the two approaches adopted in the three states under discussion is the better one. In Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, the required information is accessed by applying for it under the Right to Information Act. The provisions relating to transparency in the NREGA are also invoked. In Orissa, the required information is supplied by the local level functionaries on the basis of instructions issued by the state government.

While on the face of it, it might seem preferable to have the state government provide the information on its own, there are actually many problems with such an approach. The dependence on the state government for this critical information makes the process very vulnerable to the attitudes, efficiency and cooperation of local level officials, many of whom might not want the social audit to take place because they are apprehensive of what it might throw up. In fact, in many instances in Orissa, the local officials refused to supply the required information and repeated appeals had to be made to the state level senior officials before the information was finally received.

Also, whereas the RTI Act requires that information be provided within 30 days otherwise a penalty can be imposed on the erring officer, and the NREGA give only 7 days, there is no legally specified time limit in this arrangement

Under the RTI act there are severe penalties for supplying wrong, misleading or incomplete information. However, if information is supplied without recourse to the RTI Act then the officials can always claim that there were “inadvertent” errors in the information provided and thereby undermine the findings of a social audit.

Most important, the use of the RTI to access the information required for social audits develops among the community a sense of empowerment, for they begin to understand that the critical information that energizes the social audit process is their fundamental and legal right and not a dispensation of the government. This helps to build up a social momentum that becomes difficult to break even if the government, or a particular functionary in the government, decides at any time not to support social audits.

#### Dependence on the Government

In Rajasthan, the process of social auditing has established and grown independent of the government. However, both the Orissa and the Andhra Pradesh approaches are heavily dependent on financial support from the government. Apart from this, in Andhra Pradesh the government coordinates the effort and ensures that their officers support and participate in the process. In Orissa, access to information is dependent on government goodwill. Therefore, to this extent, the social audit process in both these states is vulnerable to government whims and fancies. And given the nature of social audits and their potential to adversely affect very powerful interests both within and outside the government, this is a dangerous vulnerability.

The Rajasthan approach, on the other hand, being financially and institutionally independent of the government, does not suffer from the same types of vulnerability. However, in the Rajasthan approach there is another type of vulnerability – one which comes out of the indifference or even the active opposition of the government. The Rajasthan approach is vulnerable because all efforts to get the state government to become a permanent partner in the social audit process have so far met with failure.

Ideally, the social audit process should be independent of both the government and the NGOs. Just as the government can lose interest in promoting social audits, or worse, develop an interest in thwarting them, so can NGOs lose interest or get co-opted or corrupted. Therefore, the final aim of all social audit regimes must be to institutionalise social auditing within the community. Social audits have their best chance of succeeding and evolving if they are under the control of those communities whose rights and benefits are being adversely affected by corruption, inefficiency and indifference. These are the stakeholders who have the most to gain from social audits, and the most to lose if the process gets corrupted or derailed.

However, before this can happen, certain conditions need to be fulfilled. Communities need to understand the process and the various steps it involves. They need to develop the skills and the confidence required for conducting proper social audits. They also need to have a collective faith, based perhaps on past experience, that whatever the risks, frustrations and setbacks, if they persevere they will finally succeed in making governments answerable to them and ensure that their voices are heard and their interests safeguarded.

Locating the process of social audits within the community is just one half of the challenge. The other half is to ensure that the government becomes and remains a partner in this process. Even when independent of the government, the social audit processes should not be de-linked from the government processes. The government has at least four critical roles to play: timely response to requests for comprehensible information, provision of a secure social audit platform, timely and appropriate follow up, and effective feedback. Towards this end, it must have an effective interface mechanism with community social auditors.

Where the state is indifferent or outrightly hostile to the process, it becomes difficult to protect, in perpetuity, those who have spoken out against powerful interests. This leads to insecurity, fear, oppression and finally a disinclination to speak out. It also means that access to the required information, though guaranteed as a legal right under the RTI Act, becomes a long and torturous process. Lack of government cooperation also implies that there would be no cognizance of the findings of social audits. Though public pressure and court intervention might lead to some remedial and follow up action, the effort and delays involved would militate against the perpetuation and growth of a social audit regime.

#### *Issues of Costs and Political Dependence*

There is also the cost factor. The benefits of a social audit, both tangible and intangible, are so numerous that it is unlikely that the financial cost of conducting a social audit, whatever that may be, would be economically unjustified. However, the cost factor becomes critical if the process is to be independent of the government. Where a model is adopted that is so costly that it is unlikely to survive if it is not supported by the government (or by some other donor), the process becomes vulnerable to the whims and fancies of the government and the donor. Besides, donor funding adds to the vulnerability of the process and makes the process open to charges of being controlled and manipulated by vested interests seeking to malign the state government, or India as a whole.



Therefore, the best alternative is to move towards self sufficiency, where the communities themselves support the system. And though this is not easy, it can be achieved over time, if the process is sufficiently frugal

The social audits conducted in Orissa have cost approximately Rs. 25,000 per gram panchayat, a total of Rs 10 lakh (1 million) for the 40 gram panchayats covered. Reportedly, it is now proposed to cover 500 plus gram panchayats in the next phase and it is estimated that this would cost Rs. 100,000 per gram panchayat – or over Rs. 5 crores (50 million) for the total.

In contrast, the social audits in Andhra Pradesh reportedly cost around Rs. 10,000 for a gram panchayat. In Rajasthan, social audits are even cheaper, though it is not always easy to compute the exact cost as much of it is directly borne by the community, especially in terms of the food they share with the social auditors.

#### *Issues of Dependence in Andhra Pradesh*

Many of the people involved with social audits in Andhra Pradesh recognise the vulnerability of the process because of its dependence on the state government. Consequently, an effort is being made by the state government to set up a registered society, independent of the government and with people of national stature as members, which could take over the task of facilitating social audits and developing social auditing skills among different community groups and departments of the government. Though initially this society would be funded by the government, hopefully it would have the freedom and ability to raise its own funds and to function independently of the government, if the need arises.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh has also recently formulated and notified a set of rules for social auditing. These include two notable sections (7 and 8) that would go a long way in facilitating independent social audits in AP. Section 7 recognises the legitimacy of social audits initiated by the affected communities and section 8 lays down the role of the state government in facilitating a social audit process that is "...independent of the implementing agency". The sections are quoted below.

#### “(7) Independent Initiative of Social Audit:

Social audit must be viewed as an ongoing process of public vigilance. Therefore, the statutory requirement of carrying out Social Audits twice a year cannot preclude any independent initiative of the wage seekers to carry out additional Social Audits as per the demand of the wage seekers. Government agencies shall esponsib to support such initiatives to the extent of providing copies of records as soon as possible, attending the meetings and taking action on the findings in the manner that is required for the regular six monthly Social Audit Gram Sabhas.

“Reports submitted in such a process shall form part of the record, and shall be responded to by the implementing agencies. Where shortcomings are found immediate action must be taken as per these rules. The social audit report as well as the action taken report must be placed before the next Gram Sabha.

#### “(8) Role of Administration in the Social Audit Process

The Social Audit will be a process independent of the implementing agency and at no time prior to, during or post the conduct of social audit shall there be an interference by

the administrative machinery at any level in the process. However, complete cooperation shall be extended to the persons conducting Social Audits. Specifically, the responsibility of the administration would be to provide required information within the specified time period, to be present during the social audit gram sabha and the public meeting and to take action on social audit findings as detailed in the Government Orders / Memos issued from time to time.” (AP Rules 2008)

In the coming months, especially as a lead up to the state assembly elections, it would be interesting to see how successful the Government of Andhra Pradesh is in weaning the social audit process and handing it over to the proposed independent society. It would also be a challenge to operationalise the social audit rules recently approved and notified by the government, especially for social audits conducted by agencies outside the government.

#### *Issues of Dependence in Orissa*

In Orissa, though there is the involvement of a large number of NGOs, there is still almost total dependence on the government both for funds and for information. Of course, neither of these dependencies is fatal and the social audit process could break loose of the government, especially as the first phase of social audits has reportedly thrown up a cadre of trained and interested NGOs.

Unfortunately, as discussed above, the approach adopted by NIRD in Orissa is not a financially frugal one. Whereas the expenditure of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 100,000 per gram panchayat seems reasonable if one looks at the methodology adopted, unfortunately it would be unsustainable if funding was not available from the government. Therefore, if the final objective of making the social audit process independent of both governments and NGOs has to be achieved, a more cost effective approach has to be adopted.

In the ultimate analysis, it is the support of the people that will determine whether the process

Reportedly, in one social audit, in Orissa, after discussion had concluded on the NREGS, the community demanded that they now be allowed to conduct their own social audit on the public distribution system and very politely asked the concerned functionaries to come on to the dais and respond to the questions and complaints of the public.

of social audit survives in Orissa. The field visits conducted in Orissa to participate in some of the social audits gave evidence of the interest of the local communities. Not only did people turn out in large numbers but they also showed great enthusiasm for the process, even though there was still little community ownership. However, whether the initial enthusiasm displayed by the local communities would continue if there is little or no follow up action and no tangible outcome, remains to be seen.

Also evident is the resolve of many of the involved NGOs to carry on with social audits, even if government

support is withdrawn. Whether this resolve will survive the resultant lack of financial resources and possible government hostility, is also an open question.

The Government of Orissa, on its part, has reportedly decided to set up a cell within the Department of Panchayati Raj, which will have consultants from outside the government. This cell would function somewhat like the Strategy and Performance Innovation Unit existing in Andhra Pradesh. It would be interesting to see whether this cell manages to achieve the functional autonomy of the AP unit while retaining the authority of the government.

### *Issues of Dependence in Rajasthan*

As already mentioned, the Rajasthan process is essentially independent of the government. Its major handicap is the unwillingness of the state government to become a partner in the process. This is not to say that the state government has never partnered the process. From time to time, over the last nearly fourteen years, local, district and state level officials have helped and supported specific social audits. The most recent example was Dungarpur, where in 2006 the whole district administration fully participated in the district wide social audit, and was actively encouraged by the state government. However, these “honeymoon” periods do not last long and each time there is a cooling off and, recently, even active hostility.

Though even after the unpleasantness in Banswara and Jhalawar, the state government has again invited the local groups to help train government staff in social auditing, past experience suggests that this change of heart might not last long.

### Follow Up and Outcome

It is difficult to sustain or even justify social audits unless they result in some positive outcome. Though social audits have many objectives, and some of the political objectives are arguably more important, at a community level most people would not remain enthused by the process unless they could see or reasonably anticipate wrongs being righted, the guilty being punished, and systems being reformed so as to minimise the chances of future wrongs. Where such outcomes are not forthcoming, cynicism can set in very fast and, once disillusioned, it is difficult to go back and again enthuse a community. Commenting on government efforts at social auditing in Rajasthan, in the late 1990s, the MKSS had described the phenomenon in the following terms.

“There are several dangers of undertaking such a half hearted exercise. Such half hearted attempts will destroy these important tools and government and the people alike will resume postures of cynicism. This will once again be recognized as tokenism, only to show that the government has taken cognisance of the fact that corruption is to be weeded out of the system. Ironically it may even serve to do the opposite.

“When the Government conducts this kind of inadequate “social audit”, they give administrative sanctity and financial approval for works done. The baffled people are witnesses to an exercise they do not understand. They are co-opted and are presented as acquiescing in an act, which impacts them negatively. The corrupt minority have bought off another coup! So, when people go back to the administration with complaints of corruption the official reaction is that “the social audit has been completed and, you yourselves have passed it in the gram sabha.”  
[MKSS nd2, p3]

Unfortunately, social audits both in Rajasthan and in Orissa face this fate. In Rajasthan this is a result of the unwillingness, from time to time, of the

A social audit was conducted in East Delhi, by a group of NGOs led by Parivartan, culminating in a public hearing on 14 December 2002. This hearing was attended by a large number of people and the panel was chaired by Justice P.B. Sawant, retired judge of the Supreme Court of India, along with Aruna Roy, Prabhash Joshi, Harsh Mander, and many other well known people. A large number of discrepancies were found in the accounts of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and many of the structures and construction for which money was paid were nowhere to be seen. Despite a concerted effort for many years, including the filing of a case in the High Court, not a single person was chargesheeted and no action was taken on any of the findings of the social audit.

government to participate in the process and thereby to take cognizance of the findings. However, strong public mobilisation, a long history of social audits, and periodic success in getting the state government to respond, has kept alive people's hopes and kept their spirits high.

In Orissa, the lack of follow up seems to have been inherent in the approach adopted, as discussed earlier. The fact that the social audits in Orissa have essentially been a part of a survey exercise, aimed at studying leakages in the NREGA, might also have been a reason for the absence of a follow up strategy. Where the primary motivation of a social audit is to test a hypothesis or, as in this case, to verify or disprove assertions about corruption made by the CEFS, then follow up action becomes a low priority. Besides, surveyors tend to go into the field for short periods of time, while ensuring follow up requires persistence and often long-term efforts.

No doubt social auditing is a very effective survey tool and can capture the type of information that would otherwise be very difficult to unearth. However, using the method of social auditing primarily or solely for survey work might be unfair to the participating communities, and could prove to be counter productive in the long term. The risks that local communities take by publicly giving evidence against powerful people can only be justified, at least in their eyes, if the guilty are appropriately and speedily punished and if there are resultant systemic improvements. Without such an outcome, the people will soon stop participating in social audits. If this happens, not only would it render ineffective a valuable survey and research methodology, but also undermine a historic opportunity to deepen participatory democracy.

Andhra Pradesh is perhaps the only one of these three states where follow up action has got the attention it deserves. As AP prepares to hand over the social audit process to agencies independent of the government, perhaps the greatest danger in this hand over is that the system of follow up will weaken and even collapse. Though section 9 of the newly notified rules for social audits (quoted below) makes it mandatory for the implementing agency to initiate the required follow up action, only time will tell how effective these rules are in safeguarding a very critical part of the social audit process.

“(9) Action on the Social Audit findings:

It is mandatory for the representatives of the implementing agency to be present at the Social Audit Gram Sabha and shall ensure that corrective action is taken on the findings and shall implement the decisions taken at the Social Audit Gram Sabha without fail and with utmost sincerity.

“Any issue which is raised during a Social Audit or any item in the Social Audit report that indicates a contravention of the Act or a shortcoming in the implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee Act should automatically be interpreted as a “complaint” under the Grievance Redressal Section of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005.

“Where there is a dispute in the findings of the Social Audit the administration shall cause enquiry and shall decide on the issue at the earliest and not later than one month;

“Wherever, in the course of a Social Audit, if evidence, through written and oral testimonies against those who have misappropriated money is established, action shall be

initiated for recovery. This action for recovery shall be without prejudice to action to be taken against the person under the relevant laws; provided that wherever it is established that these irregularities / extractions have had a direct relation to wage payments under National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, the amount shall be paid back to workers within a period of a week.” (AP Rules 2008)

### Political Will

The lessons from numerous states across the country, including Rajasthan, seem to be that, whatever the political party, getting sustained political support for social audits is difficult. Andhra Pradesh is the one exception. Orissa might also seem to be an exception, but it is perhaps too early to judge.

### *Political Support in Andhra Pradesh*

In Andhra Pradesh, the state political leaders and the grass roots politicians are supporting, or at least not vehemently opposing, the social audit process. Given the popular perception that corruption at the grassroots cannot occur without the complicity, sometimes even active participation, of the political leaders, it is difficult to imagine how the process of social audit has been allowed to establish and grow in AP. What makes Andhra Pradesh different and are there lessons for other states?

One explanation offered by the AP social audit group is that the NREGS, in its design, does not have much scope for the Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) or other district level political leaders to dispense patronage or to handle funds. As the NREGS is a rights based scheme, all those who apply are potential beneficiaries and there is no scope for selectively distributing benefits to political supporters or for financial consideration. Also, wages are paid directly into the bank or the post-office account of the wage earner, thereby making it impossible to intercept such payments at any but the local level. Corruption does occur at the local level, involving panchayat functionaries and other local level officials. However, they do not have the clout to mobilize the state political leadership to protect their interests.

It is also argued that, in Andhra Pradesh, the social audit process is politically too well known to be seriously threatened. Opposition MLAs talk about it in the assembly, to highlight instances of corruption, in an effort to embarrass the government. Treasury benches talk about it in order to show how transparent and accountable the government is and how it has recovered so much money and sacked so many corrupt officials. All in all, by this time too many MLAs have heaped too much praise on this unique and wonderful process to be able to turn around and publicly condemn it or try and restrict it. There is also the belief that social audits have now become so popular with village communities that it would be politically and administratively difficult, if not impossible, for any government to derail the process.

However, the Government of Andhra Pradesh is considering expanding the social audit process to the rural housing scheme and possibly to the scheme for distributing rice at Rs. 2 per kilogram. These schemes do not have the same structure as the NREGS and allow a far more active role to be played by the local and state level politicians. These are also old and well established schemes, unlike the NREGS, where vested interest have had time to get established. Therefore, it would be instructive to see whether the support of state and local level politicians survives the extension of social audits to these schemes

### *Political Support in Orissa*

In Orissa, the political class does not seem to have reacted to the initiation of the social audit process. There is a view that the Orissa politician is unlikely to object very vehemently to social audits, even if it means a significant reduction in their power and control.

As it happens, the findings of the first set of social audits, conducted by the NIRD and its associates had not, till recently, been made public. Nor had the government initiated action against the officials named in these social audits. Therefore the lack of political reaction to these social audits was not altogether surprising.

However, in mid September 2008, a detailed report appeared in Kalinga Times, a leading newspaper in Orissa, highlighting the findings of the NIRD led social audits. Around the same time, the state government issued instructions to the district authorities to initiate action against those who have been named in the social audits. Given the fact that adverse publicity galvanises the ruling party, and the threat of accountability galvanises the bureaucracy, it would be interesting to observe whether opposition to social audits grows among the politicians and the civil servants in the next few months, especially as state assembly elections are now round the corner.

### *Political Support in Rajasthan*

The periodic lack of political support in Rajasthan has not significantly curbed the ability of the people of Rajasthan to organise social audits, but it has made it far more difficult to bring about the systemic changes that social audits should lead to, or even to ensure that the corrupt are brought to book.

### Conflict and Violence

Abuse and violence have plagued social audits from the very beginning.

People who have dared to speak out have often been attacked. Threats of violence are common and no one knows how many people have been bullied into silence. Social auditors have been beaten up in Orissa, in Delhi, and in Rajasthan. In Jharkhand, two persons involved in facilitating social audits were even killed.

More recently, another alarming trend has emerged. People frustrated by government inaction in the face of overwhelming evidence of corruption, have taken matters into their own hands. They have abused and often physically assaulted contractors and others found to be involved in corruption. In a recent tragic incident in Orissa a contractor, who had been indicted in a social audit was killed, allegedly by "Naxalites", who reportedly wanted to teach him a lesson.

This very real potential for violence makes the role of the state all the more important. If AP has been relatively peaceful, despite an unprecedented level of recoveries and dismissals, perhaps it is because of the very strong support that the state gives to the social auditors. This certainly does not appear to be the case in Rajasthan and in Jharkhand. Though, in Orissa, the exercise has been initiated by the State Government, it is not clear how much government support there will be for the process once opposition and conflict begins in right earnest.

The involvement of the local community is equally critical if conflicts and violence are to be controlled. The state cannot, in perpetuity, protect all those who have spoken out or be present in force every time there is a social audit. It must finally be the responsibility of the community to provide long-term protection to vulnerable individuals and to deter vested interests and their hired goons from disrupting the social audit process.

Communities can be motivated to join hands and put aside their internal conflicts, and make the effort and take the risks involved, when they see a value in social audits. They must actually benefit from them, have their rights restored, and see the guilty punished. Before all this happens, community resolve to support the process is relatively weak and this is when the social audit process is most vulnerable to attack. If at this early stage, the process is disrupted, witnesses silenced through threats or bullied to change their testimonies, then social audits become non-starters. Therefore, initial help from an agency external to the local community, which can ensure security while social audits get established and local support builds up, is essential. This can be from the state government (as in AP) or from strong NGOs and movements (as in Rajasthan).

In March 2008, a social audit was conducted in Malkangiri district, Orissa. Mr. Jakob Naka, a local youth and also a beneficiary under NREGS gathered courage to speak openly during the social audit meeting to corroborate the allegations of misappropriation. Allegedly, contractor Mr. Puspa Raju threatened him with dire consequences. The threat was not taken seriously as the impression was that such a reaction is common, when people start asserting their rights and entitlements. However, some days later the contractor and some goons allegedly targeted Jacob Naka and beat him and his mother up mercilessly. Later the contractor registered a police case against both of them and the police came and took Jakob to the police station. It was only because of persistent efforts by the NIRD team and the influence of senior officials that he was finally released.

## IV CONCLUSIONS

Each of the three states under discussion appears to be at an important juncture in the evolution of the social audit process.

### Status of Social Audits in the Three States

#### *Rajasthan*

Rajasthan initiated the process, and the movements there have succeeded in building up strong public support for social audits. They have also trained a large number of people and held a large number of social audits all over the state. Yet, all their efforts to get the state government on board as a full and permanent partner in the social audit process have been unsuccessful. In fact, in recent months the government, despite some friendly overtures, seems to have become more hostile. Added to that, opposition to social audits among vested interests outside the government seems to have grown, or at least become better organised. Whereas earlier social audits were held without too many problems, even though often there was scant presence and participation of the government and little follow up, today even the conduct of a social audit is becoming difficult in many parts of the state.

In a sense these problems are not unique to Rajasthan. Many other state governments are turning their backs on social audits. In many parts of the country social audits are being disrupted and social auditors and participating communities threatened and abused. Clearly those who have for generations embezzled public funds will not retreat without a fight. Therefore, if the social audit process has to survive this challenge and move ahead to the next stage, some new strategies have to be evolved. And considering Rajasthan is the cradle in which social audits developed and grew, the country is understandably looking to them for answers.

#### *Andhra Pradesh*

Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, faces different types of challenges. For one, it is in the process of de-linking the social audit process from the government and setting it up as an independent initiative. But would the new institutional structure, a registered society, be truly independent of the government? Would it be able to withstand pressures from the government and maintain its objectivity and autonomy? On the other hand, would this de-linking affect its ability to get government officials to participate in social audits and take follow up action?

Whatever the dangers, there appears to be little choice, for elections to the state assembly are due soon and there is no guarantee that the new government that takes over will continue to support departmentally sponsored social audits. Also, the officials who have miraculously survived in the department for last three or four years would sooner or later have to move out. There is no guarantee that the next set of officers will have the same level of enthusiasm, or any enthusiasm whatsoever, for social audits. Therefore, rather than risk three years of hard work going down the drain, the social audit process in Andhra Pradesh has to be set up in an independent institution which is hopefully immune to the whims and fancies of the government of the day.

As discussed earlier, the Government of Andhra Pradesh also appears to have decided to expand the social audit process to other departments and schemes, specifically to the rural housing scheme. This also poses new challenges.



## *Orissa*

Orissa has just completed its first round of social audits. By and large these have been conducted peacefully, though there have been some stray incidents of violence and disruption. Even though the findings of the social audits are quite damning for the state government, the one saving grace is that, on the basis of the data generated, things have significantly improved in the last one year. Nevertheless, the state government has still not committed to supporting the next round of social audits. Whether they do, or whether the civil society groups who have been involved in social audits take this further on their own, the reaction from the adversely affected vested interests, mainly from among local level politicians, bureaucrats and contractors, needs to be gauged and countered. Each state manifests opposition to social audits in different ways and to a different level, but experience has shown that, sooner or later, some opposition is inevitable.

## The Challenges Ahead

Social audits, as a means for demanding accountability from governments, have proliferated all over the country. Apart from the states discussed in this paper, social audits have taken place in many other states including Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Bihar, Jharkand, and Delhi. In each of these states there has been strong opposition from various categories of affected interests, and from elements within the government. Even a cursory look at these experiences, and those of Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, seems to indicate that the two most important challenges facing the social audit process today are: how to get governments to become effective partners, and how to minimise and control the violence and opposition that is growing around social audits. Of course, the involvement of the government is likely to minimise violence and the manifestation of conflicts, and therefore ensuring that governments engage in the social audit process becomes the predominant challenge.

Perhaps the only state that does not at present face this challenge is Andhra Pradesh. Orissa might also, if all goes well, qualify to be in the same category as Andhra Pradesh, even though both have other serious challenges. But is the Andhra Pradesh model replicable?

For it to be replicable, each state needs a group of committed civil servants who have the ability to carry on a state-wide programme of social audits. It needs a political leadership that supports this process, or at least allows it to establish and grow, despite pressures from even their own party colleagues. It also needs a government that is willing to take cognizance of the findings of social audits and initiate action against its own officers. The resolve of this government to persist with social audits must survive attacks from political opponents and from their own bureaucracy. If there are states in India where such conditions prevail or can be created, undoubtedly the route followed by Andhra Pradesh is worth emulating. However, in most states this might not be a possibility. Even in Orissa it can be argued that the social audit process was initiated as a response to external pressure and it is not certain that it will persevere.

For the rest of the country there is no option but to fall back on the Rajasthan model. The interest and motivation among the people to hold governments accountable, especially at local levels, is usually much higher than the motivation among governments to be held accountable. The benefits of social audits for the people, in terms of reduced corruption and greater influence on decision making, are much greater than the benefits for the government, mainly in terms of public good will that might result for the government, which might get

converted into votes during elections. Therefore, if social audits have to proliferate, the lead has to be taken by the people and their organisations.

However, it would be an error to think that social audits are effective only as a means of exposing and preventing corruption. Though this might be the common understanding, social audits actually provide a forum where the collective wish of a community is publicly enunciated in a manner that makes it difficult to ignore.

India is today in a stage of its democracy where there are persistent and growing demands from communities across the country to be consulted and to be heard. Whether it is the location of a dam (as in the Narmada valley), the operation of a mine (as in Orissa), the acquisition of land for industry (as in Singur, West Bengal), or for special economic zones (as in Raigad District, Maharashtra), the universal demand is that the affected people must be consulted and heard. It is as strong a vote of no confidence as any, but not against any particular government or political party, but against representative democracy as a whole. The people of India are saying, in one voice, that they do not consider their elected representatives competent to safeguard their interests or speak for them. On important matters, they want to speak for themselves. They are reaffirming that they do not have confidence in bureaucratic or political institutions to ensure that basic facilities and services are made available to them; they need to ensure this on their own. They do not believe that governments can police themselves and control corruption; they need to step in and do so themselves.

However, there are no established institutional structures or processes that could fulfil the public demand for direct involvement in governance. Clearly, the people of India are not content with casting their vote once in five years and then waiting for another five years to express their approbation or disapproval of the government. Social audits, in that sense, are a beginning of a new model of democracy where communities come together around specific issues and evolve a common approach. They demand accountability from governments and insist that they be informed and consulted. It remains to be seen whether the process of social audits will transcend their current focus on works and schemes and evolve into a decentralised instrument of participatory democracy, where the country comes together, community by community, to speak out for or against proposed policies and actions of the government.

## REFERENCES

- AP Rules 2008: Government of Andhra Pradesh, Department of Rural Development, *Conducting of Social Audit – Rules, 2008*
- Ghosh 2006: Ghosh, Jayati, “Making the Employment Guarantee Work”, *Macroscan*, 20 May 2006
- Karuna Vakati Aakella, Sowmya Kidambi, Challenging Corruption with Social Audits, *Economic and Political Weekly* February 3, 2007
- MKSS nd1: MKSS, “From Information To Accountability-Reclaiming Democracy” in *Selective Writings on MKSS & Right to Information Campaign in India*, Compact Disk
- MKSS nd2: “Critique Of State Government Initiated Social Audit Campaigns and Public Hearings (Jan Sunwais)” in *Selective Writings on MKSS & Right to Information Campaign in India*, Compact Disk
- NIRD 2008: NREGS in Orissa: Sharing of Social Audit Findings – 4 August 2008 – power point presentation of the NIRD
- Rajakutty, S, Personal conversation in NIRD, 2008
- Ray 2007: Email from Parshuram Ray, Director, CEFS, Delhi to Shekhar Singh, dated 20 August 2007
- Roy 2007: Roy, Aruna, Letter on behalf of the “Rozgar Evum Suchana Ka Adhikar Abhiyan” to the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, 13 December 2007.
- Shah & Ambasta 2008: Mihir Shah & Pramathesh Ambasta, “NREGA: Andhra Pradesh Shows the Way”, *The Hindu*, 8 September 2008, editorial page.
- Sharing Meeting Minutes 2008: *Minutes of the Sharing Meeting of Forty Social Audits*, Bhubaneswar, 4<sup>th</sup> August, 2008

**Annexure I**

**ANDHRA PRADESH**

<b>SOCIAL AUDIT REPORT: DECISIONS DURING PUBLIC MEETING</b>					
<b>District : Karimnagar</b>		<b>Mandal : Peddapalle</b>		<b>From Date : 08/02/2007</b>	
				<b>To Date : 15/02/2007</b>	
<b>SOCIAL AUDIT TEAM</b>					<b>Date of Public Meeting :15/02/2007</b>
<b>No. of VSA's :</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>No. of DRP's :</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>No. of SRP's :</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>OFFICERS ATTENDED</b>					
	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>		<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
<b>Officer 1 :</b>	Sri. Satyanarayana	Dist Collector	<b>Officer 2 :</b>	Sri. Srinivas	Project Director DWMA
<b>Officer 3 :</b>	Smt.Karuna	Director of SPIU-RD	<b>Officer 4 :</b>	Smt. Dr.Jaya Laskhmi	MPP
<b>S.No</b>	<b>Village</b>	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Person Responsible</b>	<b>Amount Taken</b>	<b>Decision Taken</b>
1	Andugulapalli	Tractor owners were given Rs.60 per trip and the amount as per the pay order was taken by TA and ex sarpanch.	TA, Ex Sarpanch	72300	TA was scolded and ordered to repay the amount by PD.
2	Bandampalli	Here in this village caste feeling still exists and the BC wage seekers refused to drink water provided by SC caste wage seekers	FA		PO was advised to give awareness to the public on this issue.
3	Bhojannapet	3 wage seekers did not get payment for 2 days.	FA		PD ordered the PO to follow up and see that the payment was made.
4	Bompally	Payment was not made for 2 days.	FA		PO promised to pay the amount in two days.
5	Bompally	Collection of money in Indiramma Housing scheme from 7 benefeciaris.	FA	650	FA was ordered to repay the amount.

6	Brahmanpalle(ps)	Wage seeker of JC No.0047 did not get amount for 2 days. JC No.0227 wage seeker and her daughter did not get their wages for 13 days.		225	PO was instructed to enquire and see that the payment was made to these wage seekers.
7	Cheekurai	Collection of money in Indiramma Housing scheme from 21 beneficiaries and the amount was given to work inspector.	FA	4200	As the work inspector did not attend the public forum PD DWAM advised MPDO to enquire into the issue.
8	Gowreddipet	Amount of Rs.10 was taken from each wage seeker by FA and when she was questioned about it she submitted that she had taken the amount for xerox.	FA,BPM		PD warned the FA not to collect any money from the wage seekers and told the BPM to enter all the details in the pass books and asked the PO to check the job cards and cancel the double cards.
9	Gurrampalli	Amount misused in transporting earth by using tractor.	TA	114628	PD ordered for the removal of TA and recollection of the amount.
10	Gurrampalli	Collection of money in Indiramma Housing scheme @ 100 from 84 beneficiaries.	FA	8450	Tirupathi, the FA was suspended and ordered to recover the amount
11	Kanagarthi	Amount was drawn by FA by mentioning his wife name for 29 days without working. Balance amount was not paid to a wage seeker who died 6 months ago.	FA & BPM	3400 & 130	PD advised the PO to enquire into the issue. Postal superintendent promised to get the claim form filled and see that the amount was paid. PO was asked to check the musters and the records at the BPM and see that the payment was returned to the wage seeker.
12	Kanagarthi	Elukapalli Raju JC No.0079 worked but he did not get the payment for it but as per the post office records the amount has been withdrawn.		414	PO was asked to conduct enquiry.

13	Kasulapally	60 wage seekers did not get payment because of non submission of musters.	FA		FA was advised to submit the musters and give the details of injured to MPDO.
14	Kasulapally	Medical compensation was not paid to 3 injured people.			
15	Kothapalle	Payment was not made to 20 members in jungle clearance work. This work was done without sanction order.	PS, Sarpanch	1600	VS and sarpanch agreed to give the amount in front of social audit team. FA Kalavathi was removed from her duties for not having awareness on EGS.
16	Maredugonda	Collection of Rs.20 from 20 SC,ST farmers for putting removed silt in their fields and distributed the amount among the tractor owners. The amount that came as per the pay order was taken by the TA.	TA	97093	Rajeswara Reddi, the TA was suspended and PD said serious action would be taken.
17	Mulasala	BPM was not paying the wage seekers properly, he was retaining small amounts.	BPM	238	Postal superintendent was advised to follow up the issue and see that the balance amount should be paid.
18	Muttaram	Amount misused in transporting earth by using tractor.	TA	142474	TA was ordered to repay the amount.
19	Palthem	WID # 0004,0010,0002 Feeder Channel work done was dismantled and levelled by the land owners.	FA		PO was advised to enquire into the matter.
20	Peddabonkur	Marking muster on his own name for 12 days and giving that amount to a wage seeker who worked without job card.	FA	1653	FA was appreciated.
21	Peddabonkur	A wage seeker JC No.0004 got less amount.	FA	335	Collector told the DM to send a special officer and take necessary action and MPDO to follow up the issue.
22	Peddabonkur	Collection of money in Indiramma Housing scheme from 9 beneficiaries.	FA,BPM	28800	Collector told the DM to send a special officer and take necessary action and

					MPDO to follow up the issue.
23	Peddakalvala	12 wage seekers did not get payment for one day for the work of avenue plantation done at Peddapalli. Wages received and amount mentioned in pay order was different.	FA,BPM		FA did not have any awareness so PO was advised to remove the FA and appoint a new FA. For the difference in payment the postal superintendent said that he would send an inspector to enquire and solve the issue.
24	Peddapalli	Avenue Plantation was done with the wage seekers of 8 near by grama panchayats and difference in purchasing rate and code rate of folidol dust and super phasphate.	FA,TA	497687	PO was advised to see that the wage seekers were paid and enquire on the purchase of folidol dust and super phasphate and check the details of excess amount paid .
25	Peddapalli	The amount sanctioned for Avenue Plantation was more than was actually paid.			
26	Raghavapur	Payment was delayed and the BPM was paying only round figures in every payment and was not showing the balance in the pass book.	BPM		Postal superintendent was asked to check the BPM and repay the amount cut and the FA was advised not to be partial to her own caste people and be liberal to all.
27	Raghavapur	FA was showing caste feeling and taking the wage seekers from her own caste.			
28	Rampalle	Payment was not made for 10 days. for the Jungle Clearance work done in 11 acres without sanction order.	FA		PO was ordered to give sanction order to that work and see that the payment was done.
29	Rangampalle	Payment done twice to a wage seeker for providing water and Feeder Channel work.	FA		FA was scolded and asked not to repeat this kind of issue.
30	Rangapur	BPM was giving delayed payments and collecting Rs.100 from the beneficiaries of the Indiramma Houses. Even FA also	BPM		Postal superintendent was asked to follow up and see that the BPM repays the amount, and FA was also instructed to repay the

		asked 9 beneficiaries for an amount of Rs.100 and stated that the amount was taken for transportation and xerox.			amount. to 9 beneficiaries.
31	Sabitham	Musters and payorders were different.	FA		FA was instructed to check the musters and clear the payment.
32	Turkalamaddi kunta	FA drew amount in the name of Merugu Narasaih for watering the plantation work, but actually he did not water the plants but muster was marked.	FA		FA was scolded and said not to repeat it.



## Annexure II

### **Notes on the Field Visit to Social Audits on NREGA in Two Gram Panchayats of Mayurbhanj District**

#### First Social Audit

Name of the Grampanchayat—Chandanpur

Name of the block----- Badasahi

Date----15.05.2008

Venue – Purikhunta village.

#### **Members present in the meeting besides the local community**

B.D.O-Bhagawan Behera

A.B.D.O- P.C. Hembram

Project Director, D.R.D.A

Asst. Project Director

Junior Engineer

Gram Rozgar Sewak—Smita rani

Vigilant committee member—Dinabandhu Swain

Tapas Rath, Journalist, Sambad

Manoj Das, Journalist, Samaj

Journalist from Dharitri

Representatives of the NGO: Basti Unnayan Area Development Council

Bijoy Seva Sadan and Father Mathew from B.S.S.S

**No of the villages coming under Chandanpur G.P--13**

#### General observations

1. Villagers were keen to attend the meeting. The purpose was not very clear to them. Most of them apparently had been told that the Collector and BDO will come and a village meeting is being organized.
2. The main purpose of the meeting was explained as the social audit started but this actually irritated some persons who just wanted to share their problems with the BDO and were also disappointed that the collector did not come.
3. General feeling was that this kind of meeting should be organized. This helps them to get information (about the scheme) and also share their problems. They also were participating freely.

4. There was no sense of ownership about the meeting. It was a third party who had organized this meeting and the villagers would attend if someone else would organize similar meetings.
5. This village had been affected by flood last September. Till date people were living in broken houses and under polythene sheets. Around May 12<sup>th</sup>, they had received cheques as compensation for 1000 or 1500 rupees. As most of them only have NREGA bank account which is in a separate bank, they could not encash the cheques. This had really upset a lot of people who wanted to talk to the BDO about this. They were however being asked not to speak on topics not related to NREGA, this angered the people and subsequently the meeting had to be stopped.
6. The GP has 13 villages, the meeting was being held near the GP office and in one of the villages. However, the works which were taken up for social audit were from some other village—around 2 km away. Most persons who had worked on those works might not have been present in the social audit. This could not be clarified as the meeting was disrupted in between and finally cancelled.
7. The procedure for conducting a social audit should have been explained to the local NGOS. Initially, it seemed like a lecture. After some interventions by other NGOs and social audit volunteers, villagers were asked to speak, and they did so freely.
8. However, as the villagers were asked to speak only on NREGA, this created unrest and finally the meeting got cancelled.

### Details of the Meeting

The meeting started at 11.00 A.M. People had started trickling in from 10.00 A.M. 15<sup>th</sup> is also old age pension payment day so after all the old people had collected their pension from the Panchayat, the meeting started around 11.00 A.M. The Director, B.S.S.S, introduced the guest and observers after he initiated a silent prayer for the disaster victims. Then the secretary, B.A.D.C explained the NREGA scheme in detail by asking the people whether they had job cards or not? Whether they got work or not, and they got their passbooks and their money?

In response, the people said:

1. Some have got job cards and some have not. Some of those who have job cards have got work, and some have not!

2. The Job cards as well as passbooks with the people were examined. Cases were found where people had worked but there were no entries in the pass book. In other cases it was also found that the people had worked for fewer days and more no of days are filled up in the pass book.
3. The passbooks and job cards were kept with the contractor and not with the people.
4. People get paid @ Rs 40/- per day instead of Rs 70/- per day.
5. Also, less quantity of soil removed is recorded than actually removed.
6. In one village, the Sarpanch did not allow the people to work and he invited other village people to work.

### Observations

It was found many people became aware on NREGA in this meeting. After knowing the details, they put questions, and also complaints. People's reaction was that as the BDO has come here so, we would put all the complaints /problems/here.

After hearing them, the BDO committed to visit the village again within one week and requested the people to give all the complaints in writing. He committed to settle all the problems.

But the people were not satisfied. Their reaction was that it was difficult for them to meet the BDO and they wanted action to be taken on their complaints right then, as they had spent a lot of money and time, and come here in the heat, but all in vain.

It was found most of the people had come to the meeting with job cards, passbook and a check of Rs 1500/- to 2000/- that was given to them for repairing their house that was damaged during the floods last year. They were quite agitated as they were not able to encash the check as they have no bank account, and are not able open an account with no balance.

According to them, neither the bank nor the BDO was helping them to get their money. The flood was in September, last year. They got the cheque in April or May, this year, yet were not able to encash the check till today.

It seemed that the people were not very clear about the objectives of the meeting. They had an expectation that as all the officials, especially the collector, were coming, all of their problems would be settled and solved there and then. Because of this, a conflict situation arose during the meeting when they realized that the Collector was not coming and that their most pressing problems would not be addressed. A huge crowd gathered and the people became aggressive.

Better facilitation was needed!

### Second Social Audit

Name of the Gram panchayat—Debsole

Name of the block—Rasgovindpur

Total population of the G.P—5377

Total no of household—1202

Total no of villages—9, The villages are Bacchuripal, Sansa, Debsole, Musamari, Dahisahi, Ramchandrapur, Andari, Rangamatia.

Members present in the meeting besides the people

A.B.D.O

P.E.O—Jairam Panda

Sarpanch—Gopinath Kisku

Panchayat Secretary---Gaya Prasad Mahanayak

Gram.Rozgar.Sewak—Bidyut. Ku Das

N.G.Os —LIFE, M.Y.C, Rupayan, W I H R E T

Sameet from NIRD

Date of the meeting—16.05.2008

Venue—Near the Temple of Debsole village.

#### Details of the Meeting

1. People were keen to attend and knew that this meeting was about NREGA. They wanted such meetings to be organized in their village also and wanted to participate in them.
2. The public hearing was conducted in a systematic manner. People were encouraged to talk and give their observations, suggestions etc. Each step of the NREGA was explained and there was a good response from the villagers.
3. All grievances like--- could not apply as there was no form available or bank has not given us passbooks etc were taken up for action in the meeting itself. For example for the bank passbooks the BDO clarified that the bank had run

out of passbooks and will give it by next Tuesday. Similarly the Social audit volunteers had forms which would be filled up for those who could not apply.

### Observations

1. In comparison to the other social audit, this was quite a good meeting in terms of people's participation, discipline, no of participants, and as a learning experience. It was like an awareness campaign on NREGA.
2. Around 250 people were present with a good mix of males and females. Most of the people were unaware of the details of the NREGA and the discussion as well as the facilitation was good. People also raised questions and complaints, which were addressed there and then by the concerned persons
3. It was facilitated by Sameet, and he went step by step. After explaining one step, he asked questions from the people.

In response, the people said that:

Many had not got job cards. The procedure for applying for and using a job card was explained. The BDO assured the people that job cards would be issued to all applicants as soon as possible.

Most of them had no passbook and they complained that the bank was not cooperating. But the BDO told them that at present there was no stock with the bank, however more passbooks had been printed and will be given out soon.

Some people had got work and wages, but had been paid low wages, as per the provisions of the NREGA explained to them. The JE and other concerned officials were asked to explain.

As per the people's response, there were no facilities at the work site. At the meeting they for the first time became aware of the facilities they were entitled to.

Besides, the people also became aware about the procedure to apply for a job card, to apply for work and where, how and to whom to complain if they do not get the facilities meant for them.

The people were present till the end of the meeting.

### Annexure III

#### SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIAL AUDITS IN ORISSA - 2008

Date of Audit	Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District	Remarks
14.3.08	GP: AMBHAGOVA, BLOCK: KUTRA, DIST: SUNDARGH	On hearing complaints of late payment of wages, the BDO promised wages within 3 days of work. The Sarpanch also promised to rectify lapses. Sarpanch demanded bank payments. There were also complaints and findings of MR fudging and false payment records, but no mention of any action proposed. Materials on works have been supplied by a non-existent organisation, hinting at corruption.
15.5.08	Arapata GP Gopabandhunagar Block, Mayurbhanj District	There is a huge note in this report that says that this report and its findings are incorrect and that the report should be ignored since the social audit was not carried out properly.
1.2.08	Artal Gram Panchayat Bhawanipatna block of Kalahandi	2 villages in the Panchayat, Balipati and Urlang, have not seen or received job cards. However, Director, Special Project showed interest to rectify the situation. The programme officer also gave assurances. Reportedly, unemployment allowance is also not being given. Poor documentation, empty registers reported. reportedly there are also instances of bribes being taken and fake entries in the Muster Roll. Officials cited lack of support from above and paucity of funds. Machinery was used for work and fake entries done in MR to cover the costs. Bribery and corruption alleged at various places in the report. The Director, Special Project, announced action would be taken against the Panchayat Peon who had reportedly taken bribes from people.
1.2.08	Artal Gram Panchayat Bhawanipatna block of Kalahandi (Contradictory figures in the report on Artal)	
2.4.08	Asurabandha Gram Panchayat Sorada Block, Ganjam District	Documented cases of payment for securing job card. Also, reported that an official gave instructions to give job cards only when people turn up at work. Several complaints from card holders about having job card but not getting work. None of the substantive issues seem to have been addressed in the public hearing.
18.3.08	Badbahal GP Rairakhol Block, Sambalpur District	Several crucial registers either unopened or poorly maintained. Poor awareness levels about NREGA in the community. Fake and inflated entries reported from MR. The public hearing of the social audit was disrupted by hired goons of the local NREGA functionary. Reportedly the people are being deliberately misled in the area. The public hearing was disrupted repeatedly by the VLL and PEO and ended prematurely. None of the issues were addressed.
2.2.08	Nilabadi Gram Panchayat Bandhguon block Koraput district	Reportedly lots of fake and inflated entries found in the records. No mention of proceedings in the public hearing.
28.4.08	Baunsapokhari GP Hindol Block, Dhenkanal district	Unemployment allowance not given. Fake and inflated entries reported. Transparency boards not maintained. Use of machinery reported instead of registered labour. Reportedly, none of the officials turned up for the public hearing despite adequate notice in advance.
1.2.08	Bijepur Gram Panchayat Titilagarh Block, Bolangir	Fake and inflated entries reported. Payment of wages reported late. Delay in providing work. Non-payment of wages and wage differential between men and women. Transparency related guidelines not followed. No mention of proceedings in the public hearing.

<b>Date of Audit</b>	<b>Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
15.5.08	Chandanpur GP Badasahi block, Mayurbhanj district	Record keeping not satisfactory, but seemed better than in other reports. However, detailed village wise list of households not available. And fake and inflated entries reported from here also. Social audit team was unable to make a presentation in the public hearing which was aborted due to disruption by local goons.
19.3.08	Gram Panchayat Chandiput Block Mohana Dist Gajapati	Record keeping better than reported in other reports. However, even here, fake entries and inflated entries reported including several double entries for number of days worked over and above the actual. At the public hearing, Programme Officer of Mohana asked the Junior Engineer and the Secretary of Chandiput Gram Panchayat for clarifications. The Junior Engineer and the secretary are reported to have said that mistakes were made because of staff shortage.
16.5.08	Debsole GP Rasgobindpur block, Mayurbhanj district	Complaints made about difficulty in registration. People unaware of provisions like job demand and unemployment allowance. Fake and inflated entries detected in MR. No mention of proceedings in the public hearing in the report.
4.2.08	GP: DUDUKA, BLOCK: AGALPUR, DIST: BOLINGIR	Irregularities detected in MR including fake and inflated entries. No mention of proceedings in the public hearing.
15.3.08	Ekma Panchayat Badgaon block, Sundergarh	Reported that people of the area protested a day before hearing about non-disbursement of PDS rice. Reported to be a neglected area. Reports of payment of less than minimum wage. As well as inflated and fake MR entries. Non payment of unemployment allowance. Reportedly, job card holders said that they had been underpaid. In the public hearing, the VLW and Sarpanch were asked by the Director, Special Project, to explain. He reportedly did not find their explanation satisfactory and told the Sarpanch that he would be suspended if he did not give a satisfactory explanation in five days to the block and district administration. The Director also reportedly suspended the Executive Officer in the same public hearing on finding out about a case of misappropriation.
19.3.08	Nuaguda GP of Korukonda Block	Block or district administration not present in the public hearing. Poor record keeping reported. Panchayat office not reportedly open regularly. Inflated and fake records reported. Use of machinery and non-local labour reported. Non payment of wages reported. The public hearing was not attended by any District level officials. Only the local functionaries were present who did not address any issues. Local functionaries justified irregularities on grounds of pressure from above to complete works on time as well as corruption among officials above them.
2.2.08	Ghambhri Gram Panchayat Belpara block Bolangir district	Reported that some people have worked without job cards. Many have not received any payments. Record keeping very poor. In two of the works audited, payment was reportedly made in grain to some workers. In such payments also, there was a deviation between the MR and actual receipt of grain. Proceedings of the public hearing are not mentioned.
11.3.08	Gambhariguda Gram Panchayat Chandahandi block of Nabarangpur	Record keeping reportedly poor. Fake and inflated entries in MR. Unemployment allowance not given. Low levels of awareness among people about NREGA. Several instances of non-payment or partial payment of wages. Irregularities reported in commissioning and contracting of works. Reportedly, in the public hearing, people complained vocally about misappropriation of funds. The Sarpanch of the area while defending himself stated that he had to carry out misappropriation of funds because the higher authorities wanted a percentage out of the funds allocated/spent.

<b>Date of Audit</b>	<b>Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
16.3.08	Gangala GP of Malkangiri Block	Poor record keeping reported. Fake entries reported from MR. Deviations reported in works. Cement platforms constructed in front of some houses instead of road construction for which work was sanctioned. Reported that the public hearing was disrupted by goons of local functionaries involved in corruption. Also reported that there is a nexus between BDO and local functionaries as the BDO did not intervene when goons threatened the social audit team and local people at the public hearing.
3.2.08	Ghatmal Gram Panchayat Sinapali block of Nuapada district	Reportedly the team received little or no cooperation from the authorities to carry out the social audit. Record keeping was fair, but many entries for old works had been done only a day or two before the visit of the team. At the public hearing, while irregularities were verified from books by the officials, none of the people involved in the works were found to be present. The Director Special Project asked the BDO to carry out an enquiry into all the irregularities found.
Undated	Gumma GP Rayagada Block, Rayagada District	This is a blank report. There is only a structure with no information in it.
27.5.08	Guttingia Gram Panchayat Tikabali Block, Kandhamal District	Reported that record keeping was not satisfactory. Reported that there is a lack of awareness among villagers about NREGA. Several cases of non-payment of wages reported. Cases also reported of payment made to people who had not worked. This public hearing was reportedly well attended and people raised several issues on works done. The BDO initially did not respond because he said he had just been transferred and did not know of the details, and left soon since it started raining. Afterwards, the Sarpanch assured the people that the wages that had not been paid for works done would be paid soon.
17.3.08	GP: HADIPALLI, BLOCK: KUCHINDA, DIST: SAMBALPUR	Reported that the team not provided information till about 30 minutes before meeting. Lack of cooperation from authorities reported. Poor record keeping reported. Several cases reported of inflated entries in MR. Several instances of non-payment of wages reported. Fake entries also reported in MR. Payment of wages below minimum wage rate.
27.1.08	Joradobra Panchayat Karlamunda block Kalahandi district	Poor record keeping reported. Report states that village level functionaries have to pay a percentage of NREGA works to higher ups in the administration. That is the reason for irregularities in records. Inflated and fake entries reported from MR. At the public hearing, the BDO gave assurances that he would look into irregularities and take appropriate action. Sarpanch reportedly stated that in order to meet with the requirements of the works and non-availability of local labour, labour from outside has to be hired which is the reason for irregularities in the MR.
29.4.08	Kantapal GP Kankadahada block, Dhenkanal district	Inflated entries reported. Unavailability of proper records reported. Reportedly, during the public hearing, the BDO claimed that nobody from the Panchayat had ever demanded a job. This was vehemently contradicted by people of Phuljhar and Phuljhri saying that they had demanded jobs in February in writing. They also demanded unemployment allowance from the B.D.O. The Programme Officer later assured that jobs would be provided to the villagers.
1.2.08	Khurji Gram Panchayat comes under the Nandapur block of Koraput district	False job cards and fake entries in MR reported. Wages paid to non-existent persons.
29.5.08	Panchagaon GP Lakhanpur Block, Jharsuguda District	Proper record keeping reported. Complaints of fake, inflated entries reported. Under payment reported. Non payment and delay in payment also reported. Reportedly, in the public hearing in this case the authorities promised to respond to grievances of



Date of Audit	Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District	Remarks
		people quickly. The MLA wanted the process of social audit extended to all schemes. The Project Director, DRDA and the BDO promised to rectify the deficiencies reported in the works.
26.5.08	Lusingi GP Phiringia Block, Kondhmal District	Documentation was reportedly adequate. Some people complained that their job cards were lying with the ward member. However, these were returned during the social audit process. Inflated entries reported in MR. Compliants of delayed payment and non payment were also made. Reportedly, MR was not being kept at the worksite. Block and district officials did not turn up for the public hearing. This was attributed to delays in payment of works to people that have nbow extended to over 6 months
26.3.08	Mahupadar GP Seragada Block, Ganjam District	Documentation was reportedly inadequate, but transparency norms at the site had been followed.
18.3.08	Malarpada Gram Panchayat Block Saharpada, Keonjhar	Documentation was reportedly inadequate. Reportedly there were lots of complaints regarding delays in receiving job cards by people. There were also complaints about not receiving job cards by people despite having applied. Problems were also reported regarding delayed payment of wages as well as of fake entries for wages. MR were not available at the job sites and in many cases payments were made without entry into MR. Despite the fact that the District Collector was present at the meeting, it was disrupted by vested interests. However, there is no report of any issues being addressed or resolved. Reportedly, vested interests had also distributed liquor before the meeting, so that people would not be in a state to attend the meeting and contribute effectively.
1.2.08	MURSUNDI GRAM PANCHAYAT Block Biramaharaj Pur District Subarna Pur	Documentation was reported to be poor. Several fake and inflated entries reported. Despite the presence of the BDO and the Project Director, DRDA, there was no response from officials to address any of the issues of corruption and mis-appropriation that were reported in the public hearing. Local people also spoke against NREGA functionaries openly, but none of their grievances were addressed.
16.5.08	Murunia GP Saraskana Block, Mayurbhanj District	Documentation was reported to be good. Delays reported in distribution of job cards. Some job cards were distributed during the social audit. Reportedly, bank accounts had been opened for workers, but none of them had their pass books with them and did not even know what their account numbers were. Consequently, none of them had been able to get their hands on the money. The bank in which accounts have been opened is located 8 kms away and in not accessible to most of the people of the panchayat. Cases were also reported where middlemen and contractors had taken people to the bank to withdraw money on their behalf, and had kept most of it with themselves with little or no money being given to the workers. MR reportedly not available or filled up at the job site. Reportedly, the public hearing was disrupted and none of the issues were resolved
31.1.08	Pandasguda Gram Panchayat Boriguma block Koraput district	Inflated and fake entries reported in MR and there were major discrepancies. None of the issues were resolved in the public hearing.
13.3.08	Papdahandi Gram Panchayat Papadahandi block of Nabarangpur	Reportedly the public hearing was heavily disrupted by local vested interests including the Sarpanch and another local politician who is reportedly the main contractor for all works in the area. They were supported by the APD (Assistant Project Director??) who also helped them at the hearing. None of the issues could be resolved and the hearing was concluded without a complete presentation of the social audit. Documentation was reportedly very poor. Several fake and inflated entries reported from the MR.
Undated	Piskapanga GP Chandrapur	This is a blank report. There is only a structure with no

Date of Audit	Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District	Remarks
	Block, Rayagada District	information in it.
20.3.08	RAIKALA GRAM PANCHAYAT KEONJHAR SADAR BLOCK, KEONJHAR	Several cases of delay in delivery of job cards reported. Many job cards are reportedly in the custody of the contractor and not the people. Reportedly payments have been made without MR entries that also has several fake and inflated entries, but the overall documentation was reported to be fair despite some registers not being found. Reportedly, in the public hearing when irregularities were revealed, none of the officials reacted to the allegations or provided any clarifications. This public hearing was also disrupted and could not be completed. The person responsible for disrupting the meeting was the brother of the local MLA.
25.3.08	GP: SARASPOSI, BLOCK: GHATGAON, DIST: KEONJHAR	Inflated and fake entries reported in MR. Non payment of wages also reported. Works have also not been completed. At the public hearing, none of the substantive issues were addressed. The authorities hid behind the excuse of not being aware of the provisions of NREGA and made vague promises that the situation would improve. One of the local politician tried to disrupt the meeting but was reportedly thrashed and expelled, mainly by the women gathered together at the public hearing.
17.3.08	SARSARA BALANG Bonaigarh block, Sundergarh	Documentation was reported to be very poor. Instances of corruption reported in issuing job cards. The social audit team was unable to properly audit indepth any of the works. At the public hearing, the EE, DRDA announced the following measures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Directed the peon of the Panchayat to return back the money taken by him for providing the job card within 3 days or face dire consequences.</li> <li>• Recovery of amount would be made from the Panchayat peon which he had collected for job card</li> <li>• He also ordered departmental inquiry against the Panchayat secretary for forging the muster roll and directed him to return back the money taken away in the name of the laborers.</li> <li>• Mr Banarjee also ensured the people that they will be given payment for their tools as per the order of government.</li> <li>• He asked the BDO to settle the due payment within seven days.</li> <li>• He suggested Panchayat functionaries to make the people aware regarding the NREGA and asked the Panchayat staffs to maintain the Panchayat records properly.</li> <li>• He requested the Sarpanch to help the villagers to open their bank account within 7 days.</li> <li>• He also requested the villager's to be present during the palli sabha more in numbers.</li> </ul>
14.3.08	GP: SARUALI, BLOCK: BARKOTE, DIST: DEOGARH	Documentation was reported to be fairly good. Inflated and fake entries detected in MR. Corruption reported in issuing job cards. Transparency norms not followed. Reportedly, the Director, Special Projects did not let the social audit team complete their presentation. None of the issues brought out through the audit, it seems, were addressed. Reportedly, the Director gave a rousing speech on how things had improved in NREGA and exhorted the villagers to open bank accounts as well as to get registered and demand work.
28.3.08	Sihala Gram Panchayat Kukudakhandi Block, Ganjam District	Reportedly the documentation was fairly good. Reportedly, jobs under NREGA are not being demanded because local people can earn better by extracting fuel wood from the nearby forest and selling it. Also, problems of wage payment deter people from taking NREGA works. While bank accounts have been opened and money deposited, reportedly the Sarpanch lurks around the bank and forcibly takes away a percentage of the money

Date of Audit	Gram Panchayat/ Block/ District	Remarks
		withdrawn by the workers from their NREGA accounts. At the public hearing, the Programme Officer of the block assured that he would look into the matters of non payment of wages and expedite the process. No other substantive issues seemed to have been addressed.
20.3.08	Siali Gram Panchayat Block Kashi Nagar District Gajapati	Documentation was reportedly poor. Several inflated and fake entries were found in the MR. Job cards were found to be in the possession of the village labour leader. Reportedly, the workers refused to give written testimonials of their complaints to the social audit team. The public hearing was disrupted and the social audit team could not complete its presentation. None of the substantive issues were therefore addressed. However, the Project Director asked the social audit team to hand over their report and findings so that he could take appropriate action.

## Annexure IV

### FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL AUDITS – DISTRICT LEVEL SUMMARY - 1

District	Estimate Cost	Expenditure	Total Beneficiaries	Surveyed Beneficiaries	Actual no of Beneficiaries	%
Bolangir	2926000	2308077	713	327	278	85.02
Boudh	932000	932000	253	114	81	71.05
Deogarh	1150000	1028929	296	81	57	70.37
Dhenkanal	1860000	1800545	586	475	197	41.47
Gajapati	1300000	1201119	569	266	195	73.31
Ganjam	2200000	1120490	661	642	642	100
Jharsuguda	1298000	1287586	268	47	46	97.87
Kalahandi	3003269	3000832	967	221	52	23.53
Kandhamal	1930000	1872299	927	387	363	93.8
Kendujhar	3380000	3379007	1025	595	422	70.92
Koraput	2612000	2666310	1040	915	662	72.35
Malkangiri	2096000	1642807	324	251	76	30.28
Mayurbhanj	6702493	1681251	738	397	338	85.14
Nabarangpur	2306000	2014513	672	443	306	69.07
Nuapada	70000	67000	32	23	23	100
Rayagada	1600000	895922	323	150	84	56
Sambalpur	2592000	2198643	737	279	224	80.29
Subarnapur	1650000	1108572	724	422	50	11.85
Sundergarh	3701100	2888221	1182	346	284	82.08
	<b>43308862</b>	<b>33094123</b>	<b>12037</b>	<b>6381</b>	<b>4380</b>	<b>68.64</b>

FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL AUDITS – DISTRICT LEVEL SUMMARY - 2

District	Total Person Days Reported	Surveyed Person Days	Actual Person Days found	%
Bolangir	14114	6291	2969	47.19
Boudh	6892	2273	1250	54.99
Deogarh	7661	2679	786	29.34
Dhenkanal	11942	8858	2397	27.06
Gajapati	10601	4726	3312	70.08
Ganjam	11229	10600	10600	100
Jharsuguda	4256	466	281	60.3
Kalahandi	17086	6351	752	11.84
Kandhamal	17727	8435	7354	87.18
Kendujhar	17959	10936	3031	27.72
Koraput	16611	10062	4948	49.18
Malkangiri	9250	6376	990	15.53
Mayurbhanj	11683	5466	4226	77.31
Nabarangpur	15188	8447	2967.5	35.13
Nuapada	944	944	336	35.59
Rayagada	7376	3782	2043	54.02
Sambalpur	17562	7058	2748	38.93
Subarnapur	10485	6526	1016	15.57
Sundergarh	19473	5069	2853	56.28
	<b>228039</b>	<b>115345</b>	<b>54859.5</b>	<b>47.56</b>

FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL AUDITS – DISTRICT LEVEL SUMMARY - 3

District	Wages recorded as paid to sample beneficiaries (Rs.)	Wages that actually reached the beneficiaries (Rs.)	%
Bolangir	355775.5	151325	42.53
Boudh	212240	100485	47.34
Deogarh	225203	75590	33.57
Dhenkanal	510070	126441	24.79
Gajapati	246185	128875	52.35
Ganjam	717841	703061	97.94
Jharsuguda	27306	17994	65.9
Kalahandi	387441	48120	12.42
Kandhamal	512410	449103	87.65
Kendujhar	635493	160427	25.24
Koraput	1175301	295592	25.15
Malkangiri	378604	41137	10.87
Mayurbhanj	463253	334943	72.3
Nabarangpur	606853	163698	26.97
Nuapada	63522	26100	41.09
Rayagada	216255	100630	46.53
Sambalpur	542388	230777	42.55
Subarnapur	414268	10570	2.55
Sundergarh	414487.5	223927	54.03
	<b>8104896</b>	<b>3388795</b>	<b>41.81</b>

**FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL AUDITS – GRAM PANCHAYAT LEVEL - 1**

<b>District</b>	<b>Block</b>	<b>GP</b>	<b>Year of Implementation</b>	<b>Estimate Cost</b>	<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>Total Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Surveyed Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Actual no of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>%</b>
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2007-08	146000	149829	37	21	20	95.24
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2005-06	250000	140000	78	26	24	92.31
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2006-07	480000	468248	106	57	55	96.49
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	1000000	500000	104	47	44	93.62
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	200000	200000	70	12	8	66.67
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	200000	200000	75	9	9	100
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2006-08	150000	150000	54	28	27	96.43
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2007-08	100000	100000	75	69	33	47.83
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2006-07	400000	400000	114	58	58	100.00
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-08	142000	142000	36	14	10	71.43
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-07	290000	290000	60	46	17	36.96
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-07	500000	500000	157	54	54	100.00
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2006-07	500000	495203	68	17	7	41.18
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2006-07	450000	333876	131	33	25	75.76
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2007-08	200000	199850	97	31	25	80.65
Dhenkanal	Hindol	Baunsa Pokhari	2007-09	493000	454196	42	40	38	95.00
Dhenkanal	Hindol	Baunsa Pokhari	2006-07	500000	497691	61	57	57	100.00
Dhenkanal	Kankadahad	Kantapal	2006-07	378000	378000	228	150	63	42.00
Dhenkanal	Kankadahad	Kantapal	2006-07	489000	470658	255	228	39	17.11
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2006-08	300000	289990	78	34	23	67.65
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2007-08	300000	300000	50	23	23	100.00
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2006-07	300000	219997	209	83	23	27.71
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2006-08	100000	101244	77	50	50	100.00
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2007-08	200000	196526	118	55	55	100.00
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2006-07	100000	93362	37	21	21	100.00
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	200000	135341	38	19	19	100.00
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	150000	83037	39	39	39	100.00
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	100000	90379	59	59	59	100.00

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Estimate Cost	Expenditure	Total Beneficiaries	Surveyed Beneficiaries	Actual no of Beneficiaries	%
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	400000	32970	37	37	37	100.00
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	300000	64676	35	35	35	100.00
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	50000	50385	37	37	37	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	500000	163702	193	193	193	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	250000	250000	96	96	96	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	250000	250000	127	127	127	100.00
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2007-08	500000	496000	90	11	11	100.00
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2006-07	408000	408000	106	14	14	100.00
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2006-07	390000	383586	72	22	21	95.45
Kalahandi	Bhawanipatna	Artal	2006-07	800000	806000	300	90	10	11.11
Kalahandi	Bhawanipatna	Artal	2006-07	900000	894426	201	63	13	20.63
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	500000	500406	200	34	17	50.00
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	503269	500000	197	26	6	23.08
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	300000	300000	69	8	6	75.00
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	440000	423626	302	130	113	86.92
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	495000	455759	304	69	68	98.55
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	500000	497406	265	141	135	95.74
Kandhamal	Tikabali	Gutingia	2006-07	495000	495508	56	47	47	100.00
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	500000	500000	198	121	13	10.74
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	250000	250000	110	67	66	98.51
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	500000	500000	179	89	80	89.89
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	800000	799000	169	80	80	100.00
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	330000	330000	49	21	21	100.00
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	400000	400000	63	20	20	100.00
Kendujhar	Saharapada	Malarpada	2006-07	300000	300007	207	159	117	73.58
Kendujhar	Saharapada	Malarpada	2006-07	300000	300000	50	38	25	65.79
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2007-08	500000	500000	136	118	118	100.00
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2006-07	500000	500000	183	129	65	50.39
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2006-07	348000	348000	183	130	33	25.38



District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Estimate Cost	Expenditure	Total Beneficiaries	Surveyed Beneficiaries	Actual no of Beneficiaries	%
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2006-07	300000	300000	86	86	55	63.95
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2006-07	295000	349000	53	53	43	81.13
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2007-08	300000	300000	278	278	278	100.00
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	100000	100310	51	51	25	49.02
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	169000	169000	49	49	27	55.10
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	100000	100000	21	21	18	85.71
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	70000	70000	34	34	9	26.47
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	500000	496478	99	67	23	34.33
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	70000	70000	36	36	2	5.56
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2007-08	586000	250914	36	36	10	27.78
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2006-07	500000	500000	83	42	21	50.00
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2007-08	370000	255415	36	36	11	30.56
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2006-07	300000	134200	53	37	27	72.97
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2007-08	350000	219968	64	22	21	95.45
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2006-08	350000	105548	172	50	24	48.00
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	500000	146087	112	51	51	100.00
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	3552493	350048	73	22	22	100.00
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	500000	246094	76	35	35	100.00
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	300000	62423	48	40	18	45.00
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	350000	213445	56	56	56	100.00
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	500000	203438	84	84	84	100.00
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	316000	250000	81	35	35	100.00
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	1000000	989733	163	80	57	71.25
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	250000	250000	129	80	60	75.00
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2006-07	400000	397588	166	130	70	53.85
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2007-08	300000	86682	72	57	57	100.00
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2007-08	20000	20389	30	30	0	0.00
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2006-07	20000	20121	31	31	27	87.10
Nuapada	Sinapali	Ghatamal	2007-08	70000	67000	32	23	23	100.00
Rayagada	Rayagada	Gumma	2007-08	400000	194108	51	25	22	88.00
Rayagada	Rayagada	Gumma	2006-07	200000	200000	88	51	29	56.86

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Estimate Cost	Expenditure	Total Beneficiaries	Surveyed Beneficiaries	Actual no of Beneficiaries	%
Rayagada	Chandrapur	Piskapanga	2006-07	500000	267803	141	50	12	24.00
Rayagada	Chandrapur	Piskapanga	2007-08	500000	234011	43	24	21	87.50
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2007-08	344000	244000	113	86	77	89.53
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2006-07	431000	350000	166	34	33	97.06
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2007-08	500000	500000	120	27	26	96.30
Sambalpur	Rairakhola	Badbahal	2006-07	450000	261156	64	15	9	60.00
Sambalpur	Rairakhola	Badbahal	2006-07	467000	443487	135	42	33	78.57
Sambalpur	Rairakhola	Badbahal	2006-07	400000	400000	139	75	46	61.33
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	500000	389407	361	189	24	12.70
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	550000	458010	257	175	18	10.29
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	600000	261155	106	58	8	13.79
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	500000	501275	89	54	54	100.00
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	500000	501141	269	80	72	90.00
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	492000	496157	232	30	23	76.67
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	250000	237662	69	40	37	92.50
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	493000	358498	170	38	34	89.47
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	250000	141154	79	33	31	93.94
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	241000	208584	23	23	16	69.57
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	477100	335619	192	20	10	50.00
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	498000	108131	59	28	7	25.00
				<b>43308862</b>	<b>33094123</b>	<b>12037</b>	<b>6381</b>	<b>4380</b>	<b>68.64</b>

FINDINGS OF THE SOCIAL AUDITS – GRAM PANCHAYAT LEVEL - 2

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Total Person Days	Surveyed Person days	Actual person days	%	Wage paid to Sample beneficiaries	Actually reached the beneficiaries	%
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2007-08	560	290	120	41.27	20300	6245	30.76
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2005-06	2049	637	417	65.46	28490	18210	63.91
Bolangir	Agalpur	Duduka	2006-07	2252	1197	381	42.27	70485	25490	36.16
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	1975	1128	847	75.09	61820	44175	71.46
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	774	168	75	44.64	13822.5	6770	48.98
Bolangir	Belpara	Gambhari	2006-07	1010	248	117	47.18	16593	9261	55.81
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2006-08	780	414	213	51.45	22770	11250	49.41
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2007-08	274	238	108	45.38	13090	5079	38.80
Bolangir	Titlagarh	Bijepur	2006-07	4440	1971	691	35.06	108405	24845	22.92
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-08	1136	306	76	24.84	29100	7150	24.57
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-07	1296	372	360	96.77	48165	39800	82.63
Boudh	Kantamal	Similipadar	2006-07	4460	1595	814	51.03	134975	53535	39.66
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2006-07	2016	522	63	12.07	35426	3386	9.56
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2006-07	3181	1239	410	33.09	116407	53064	45.58
Deogarh	Barkote	Saruali	2007-08	2464	918	313	34.10	73370	19140	26.09
Dhenkanal	Hindol	Baunsa Pokhari	2007-09	720	612	558	91.18	50820	40200	79.10
Dhenkanal	Hindol	Baunsa Pokhari	2006-07	1002	906	601	66.34	54510	16500	30.27
Dhenkanal	Kankadahad	Kantapal	2006-07	5251	3410	693	20.32	187710	39342	20.96
Dhenkanal	Kankadahad	Kantapal	2006-07	4969	3930	545	13.87	217030	30399	14.01
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2006-08	2309	1178	252	21.39	33530	8820	26.30
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2007-08	2298	1059	588	55.52	76250	37730	49.48
Gajapati	Kasinagar	Siali	2006-07	2850	315	195	61.90	17325	7260	41.90
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2006-08	1231	885	927	104.75	23145	15905	68.72
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2007-08	1077	704	695	98.72	82460	50470	61.21
Gajapati	Mohona	Chandiput	2006-07	836	585	655	111.97	13475	8690	64.49
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	1189	560	560	100.00	35785	21005	58.70
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	720	720	720	100.00	47460	47460	100.00
Ganjam	Kukudakhandi	Sihala	2007-08	707	707	707	100.00	45020	45020	100.00

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Total Person Days	Surveyed Person days	Actual person days	%	Wage paid to Sample beneficiaries	Actually reached the beneficiaries	%
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	444	444	444	100.00	31080	31080	100.00
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	564	564	564	100.00	39480	39480	100.00
Ganjam	Surada	Asurabandha	2007-08	883	883	883	100.00	48565	48565	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	2310	2310	2310	100.00	162180	162180	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	2226	2226	2226	100.00	154771	154771	100.00
Ganjam	Sheragada	Mahupadar	2007-08	2186	2186	2186	100.00	153500	153500	100.00
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2007-08	873	144	115	79.86	8890	7772	87.42
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2006-07	2171	167	78	46.71	9310	4075	43.77
Jharsuguda	Lakhanpur	Panchagaon	2006-07	1212	155	88	56.77	9106	6147	67.50
Kalahandi	Bhawanipatna	Artal	2006-07	3408	2160	174	8.06	120120	8300	6.91
Kalahandi	Bhawanipatna	Artal	2006-07	7668	2712	81	2.99	149160	3600	2.41
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	2618	807	236	29.24	75577	21550	28.51
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	2447	560	223	39.82	36424	12770	35.06
Kalahandi	Karlamunda	Joradobra	2006-07	945	112	38	33.93	6160	1900	30.84
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	5587	2618	2132	81.44	159966	137859	86.18
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	4766	1380	1311	95.00	82897	75950	91.62
Kandhamal	Phiringia	Luisingi	2006-07	5353	2591	2577	99.46	148155	147702	99.69
Kandhamal	Tikabali	Gutingia	2006-07	2021	1846	1334	72.26	121392	87592	72.16
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	4844	2940	97	3.30	205800	7700	3.74
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	1320	804	315	39.18	44220	13243	29.95
Kendujhar	Ghatgaon	Sarasa Pasi	2006-07	3829	2055	772	37.57	113025	41150	36.41
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	2340	1426	392	27.49	41353	19793	47.86
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	836	351	208	59.26	19360	6710	34.66
Kendujhar	Kendujhar Sadar	Raikala	2006-07	944	310	71	22.90	7790	3840	49.29
Kendujhar	Saharapada	Malarpada	2006-07	3034	2413	978	40.53	168910	57241	33.89
Kendujhar	Saharapada	Malarpada	2006-07	812	637	198	31.08	35035	10750	30.68
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2007-08	2837	1896	860	45.36	361298	79897	22.11
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2006-07	4463	1246	227	18.22	324090	59750	18.44

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Total Person Days	Surveyed Person days	Actual person days	%	Wage paid to Sample beneficiaries	Actually reached the beneficiaries	%
Koraput	Borigumma	Pondasguda	2006-07	3312	964	239	24.79	167468	42765	25.54
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2006-07	1118	1118	562	50.27	61490	30620	49.80
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2006-07	910	910	474	52.09	49840	26870	53.91
Koraput	Nandapur	Khurji	2007-08	2350	2350	1783	75.87	123470	21390	17.32
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	753	753	266	35.33	41735	11180	26.79
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	588	588	315	53.57	32340	10400	32.16
Koraput	Bandhugaon	Nilabadi	2006-07	280	237	222	93.67	13570	12720	93.74
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	885	885	29	3.28	48675	1140	2.34
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	2878	1964	367	18.69	110309	17635	15.99
Malkangiri	Korukonda	Nuaguda	2006-07	834	834	8	0.96	45870	400	0.87
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2007-08	864	864	137	15.86	60480	9842	16.27
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2006-07	2944	984	137	13.92	54120	4620	8.54
Malkangiri	Malkangiri	Gangala	2007-08	845	845	312	36.92	59150	7500	12.68
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2006-07	1540	575	163	28.35	57832	17465	30.20
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2007-08	517	166	164	98.80	13720	10740	78.28
Mayurbhanj	Badasahi	Chandanpur	2006-08	2813	1088	391	35.94	75119	18180	24.20
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	1292	554	556	100.36	65132	53559	82.23
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	769	264	219	82.95	18480	15330	82.95
Mayurbhanj	Saraskana	Murunia	2007-08	809	287	194	67.60	19740	13510	68.44
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	1701	280	291	103.93	23484	16693	71.08
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	539	539	535	99.26	38690	38410	99.28
Mayurbhanj	Rasgovindpur	Debasole	2007-08	1703	1713	1713	100.00	151056	151056	100.00
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	4585	2245	412.5	18.37	111485	25060	22.48
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	4195	2334	404	17.31	151150	36551	24.18
Nabarangpur	Papadahandi	Papadahandi	2006-07	2384	1197	762	63.66	102771	35352	34.40
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2006-07	2428	1279	735	57.47	132825	24670	18.57
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2007-08	864	660	400	60.61	67773	29065	42.89
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2007-08	360	360	0	0.00	20389	0	0.00
Nabarangpur	Chandahandi	Gambariguda	2006-07	372	372	254	68.28	20460	13000	63.54
Nuapada	Sinapali	Ghatamal	2007-08	944	944	336	35.59	63522	26100	41.09

District	Block	GP	Year of Implementation	Total Person Days	Surveyed Person days	Actual person days	%	Wage paid to Sample beneficiaries	Actually reached the beneficiaries	%
Rayagada	Rayagada	Gumma	2007-08	767	394	357	90.61	28750	19430	67.58
Rayagada	Rayagada	Gumma	2006-07	2293	1542	1147	74.38	91905	55950	60.88
Rayagada	Chandrapur	Piskapanga	2006-07	3800	1330	263	19.77	76230	9270	12.16
Rayagada	Chandrapur	Piskapanga	2007-08	516	516	276	53.49	19370	15980	82.50
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2007-08	2213	1546	727	47.02	164805	71176	43.19
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2006-07	2400	405	282	69.63	39306	25000	63.60
Sambalpur	Kuchinda	Hadipali	2007-08	2404	492	380	77.24	84702	52705	62.22
Sambalpur	Rairakhol	Badbahal	2006-07	1539	457	120	26.26	25135	7341	29.21
Sambalpur	Rairakhol	Badbahal	2006-07	4441	1556	568	36.50	83770	36090	43.08
Sambalpur	Rairakhol	Badbahal	2006-07	4565	2602	671	25.79	144670	38465	26.59
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	4532	2428	659	27.14	133540	2120	1.59
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	4317	3188	221	6.93	249695	6700	2.68
Subarnapur	Biramaharajpur	Mursundhi	2006-07	1636	910	136	14.95	31033	1750	5.64
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	1027	662	416	62.84	42409	23910	56.38
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	4759	1511	956	63.27	139923.5	91215	65.19
Sundergarh	Bargaon	Ekma	2006-07	3657	619	360	58.16	49913	21544	43.16
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	938	467	322	68.95	25555	15905	62.24
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	3241	765	413	53.99	86956	48916	56.25
Sundergarh	Kutra	Ambhagova	2006-07	668.5	250	208	83.20	14200	10870	76.55
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	524	308	26	8.44	15950	0	0
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	3764	369	70	18.97	28630	6736	23.53
Sundergarh	Bonaigarh	Sarsara Balang	2006-07	894	118	82	69.49	10951	4831	44.11
				<b>228038.5</b>	<b>115345</b>	<b>54859.5</b>	<b>47.56</b>	<b>8104896</b>	<b>3388795</b>	<b>41.81</b>